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CHAPTER I
THE STUDY: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
In the United States public education is a function of state
government. Each of the fifty states has both the power and the
responsibility to establish and maintain a system of free public edu-
cation for its citizens. In meeting their educational responsibilities
the states have created semi-autonomous school administrative districts
on local, city, regional, or county-wide basis. ^ Within the broad
guidelines established by the respective states, local school boards
have been entrusted with the governance of the local schools. The
local board may be either an elected or an appointed body. The primary
function of the local school board is that of establishing educational
policy; the actual administration of the schools is (ideally) delegated
to the superintendent of schools and his administrative staff.
Despite the popular myth that school boards are adjuncts of local
government, they are instruments of state government created for the
sole purpose of fulfilling the state’s educational objectives. And as
creations of the state, the state exercises plenary control over
their
functions. Accordingly, the state may "instruct, advise,
direct,
create, or abolish them in accordance with its (state)
judgement
1 Hawaii is the exception to this statement,
state-wide school uistrict.
Hawaii has a single,
22
regarding the welfare of education in the state".
Historically there can be observed an accelerated trend toward a
reorganization and consolidation of school districts. From an estimated
127,244 school districts in the United States in 1932, a recent study
revealed that in the 1970-71 school year there were only 17,896 school
districts, and of these 743 were classified as "non-operating" dis-
3
tricts. The extent of this decline in school districts is further
highlighted by the fact that in the 1960-61 school year there were twice
4
as many school districts as existed in the 1970-71 school year.
Revenues for the operation of the public schools are obtained from
several sources. In the 1970-71 school year it was estimated that 6.9
percent of the total revenue for public elementary and secondary schools
came from the federal government; 41.1 percent from state and county
governments; and, the remaining 52.0 percent from local sources.
3
It
is this latter method of financing public education that is currently
being tested in the courts, and which, in all probability, will be
2
Edgar Morphet
,
Roe Johns, and Theodore L. Reller, Educational Organi-
zation and Administration: Concepts, Practices and Issues (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 269.
3
National Education Association, NEA Research Bulletin, Vol. 49, No. 2,
May 1971, pp. 52-53.
^ Ibid
.
, p . 53.
5
Ibid
.
,
pp. 52-53.
3replaced by a more equitable method of financing public education. 6 It
was the 6 to 1 decision by the Supreme Court of California (Serrano v.
Priest, General Civil No. 938254, Super. CT.
,
Los Angeles County) that
paved the way for similar assaults on school financing in a score or
more states. Minnesota's system has been upset by a Federal court.
And, in December a Federal three judge panel adopted the Serrano prin-
ciple to strike down the Texas system. Developments in New York State
indicate that basic reforms, if not exactly around the corner, may well
be on its way. A blue-ribbon commission appointed by Governor Rockefel-
ler and the Board of Regents in 1969 has recommended that the State
assume responsibility for raising and distributing all public educa-
tional funds.
^
President Nixon in his State of the Nation address on January 20,
1972 promised a federal substitute for the existing "oppressive and
discriminatory" method of financing education through local property
taxes. It was reported that government sources were recommending the
adoption of a federal "value-added" tax as the source of educational
8
revenues
.
See, for a detailed treatment of the "Serrano Jr., et al. and the
school tax equality" issue, "A Challenge for Education: Making Ends
Meet - Fairly", The New York Times, Annual Education Review , January
10, 1972, p. El.
"Schools: A Plan to Narrow That Dollar Gap", The New York Times,
October 24, 1971, p. 14.
"National Sales Tax Hinted by President", The Springfield Union,
January 21, 1972, p. 1.
4In the 1970-71 school year total expenditures (excluding capital
outlay and interest) on public elementary and secondary day schools was
almost $36 billion - approximately 3% of the year's Gross National
Product. It is further estimated that of these educational expendi-
tures, between 80 and 85 percent were for the salaries of instructional
9
and non-instructional personnel. In many school systems teachers'
salaries have increased substantially in the past few years, thus im-
posing additional financial burdens on local communities. There is
little doubt that the introduction of teacher collective bargaining has
strongly influenced this increase in teacher salaries.
Prior to 1962 no board of education in the United States was re-
quired by law to negotiate with its school teachers; and only a handful
of school boards had voluntarily entered into written collective bar-
gaining agreements with their school teachers and administrators. How-
ever, by the opening of the 1970-71 school year dramatic changes were
evident. Fifteen states had passed separate bargaining legislation ap-
plying only to school employees; and, eleven other states had passed
bargaining legislation guaranteeing bargaining rights to all public
xo
employees of the state and local governments. While there exists
NEA, loc. cit .
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode xslanu, Iexas,
Vermont, and Washington all have so-called "teacher bargaining stat-
utes"; Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin have bargaining
legislation applicable to most ether categories of public employees.
5considerable differences between the various teacher bargaining statutes,
the vast majority of these statutes either permit or require the school
board to enter into collective agreements with certified teacher organi-
zations. The subjects of these agreements evolve around the wage,
hour and working conditions trilogy. And, as the teachers have been
interested in "improving" their wages, hours and working conditions,
local boards have had to appropriate additional revenues to pay for
these improvements.
In many instances local boards have resisted teacher demands with
12the result that the teachers have resorted to illegal work stoppages.
The statistics reveal that as teacher collective bargaining has spread,
the incidence of strike activity has increased. In the 1962-63 school
year there were only 15 recorded work stoppages involving an estimated
26,440 public school teachers; this increased yearly until in the 1968-
69 year there were 347 work stoppages involving over 265,000 school
13
teachers. It is further reported that in the 1969-70 school year
The two major teacher organizations are the National Education
Association and the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO. In
1970 66 percent of the total instructional staff were employed in
public school systems which had a labor agreement.
Under certain conditions specific groups of public employees may
engage in strike activities in Hawaii and Pennsylvania. The Vermont
public employee bargaining statute can be interpreted to permit
strikes by some public employees in specific circumstances.
LMRS
,
Public Employee Strikes: Causes and Effects (Washington:
Labor Management Relations Service, 1971), p. 14.
6there were about 37% more strikes than in the previous year. Strong
arguments may be made that teacher strikes will increase both in number
and intensity in the years to come.
Collective bargaining replaces the traditional unilateral decision
making process with bilateral negotiations. Concern is increasingly
being expressed that in so doing, collective bargaining has imposed
such additional demands upon school board members that many members are
reluctant to seek re-election. In commenting upon the impact of collec-
tive bargaining on local board members, Professor Unruh of Saint Louis
University states that "(s)ome capable men may be discouraged from
serving on the local board and giving of the time required to carry on
the work, or to expose themselves to certain kinds of abuse which is
often directed toward them personally." He further states, "(o)thers
14
may drop their membership while recalling the 'good old days'". Pre-
sumably the good old days to which he refers are a bygone era during
which the demands made of a board member were minimal.
Leiberman and Moskow are in agreement that collective bargaining
will complicate the school board member’s job. However, they go further
and predict that the "(b)oard members will find it increasingly diffi-
cult to participate in negotiations opposite the negotiation leaders
(union) who work full time at the task". Yet they believe that the lo-
cal board will be reluctant to utilize the services of professional
Adolph Unruh. "Learning the Art of Confrontation", Peabody Journal
of Education, Vol. 46 (January 1968), p. ^35.
7negotiators because the boards do not want to be further removed from
the control of the decision-making process. ^ The authors also predict
that the bargaining power of the local boards will tend to diminish
because both the boards and their administrative staffs lack the pro-
fessional assistance currently available to the local teacher organiza-
tions .
Many educational leaders have been groping for an effective alter-
native that will provide teachers with an effective voice in educa-
tional decision-making, while at the same time freeing board members
from the added demands imposed upon them by teacher collective bar-
gaining. Dr. Helsby, Chairman of the Public Employment Relations Board
for the State of New York has suggested that "regional" collective bar-
gaining is the answer. He comments that "...the question is increas-
ingly being raised as to whether there should be some form of regional
negotiations for all of the school districts of a particular county or
region, or perhaps even statewide negotiations for all teachers".
"Education will," he goes on to say, "experience increasing difficulty
unless some form of more centralized negotiations can be developed. The
regional approach has, in my (Helsby) opinion, real merit despite in-
, u J ..16
herent difficulties in getting such a system launched.
^ Myron Leiberman and Michael Moskow. Collective Negotiations for
Teachers: An Approach to School Administration (Chicago : Rand
McNally & Co., 1966), p. 412.
^
"Regional, Statewide Bargaining Advocated for School Negotiations ,
PERB News, Vol. 3, No. 9 (September 1970), p. 1.
8The New York State Education Commissioner, Ewald Nyquist, at a
joint press conference suggested that all collective negotiations in
school districts be centralized. He states that "(w)e are working
toward eventual negotiations on a state-wide basis. A radical change
such as this, however, will not occur overnight, but will take a period
of years to bring about and require a new plan of financing." He goes
on to say that "the present district-by-district negotiations arrange-
ment is wasteful, detracts from effective administration of the school
district and encourages whipsawing techniques."^
More recently, at a four-day meeting of the American Assembly on
"Collective Bargaining in American Government", the Assembly recommended
that centralized multi-employer and multi-union bargaining be adopted
in public employment. It is their opinion that, "the broadening of
bargaining can help avoid the confusion of dealing with a multiplicity
of bargaining units, can raise the level of expertise, and lower the
18
cost of negotiations."
The concept of multi-employer bargaining is not new. It has been
utilized in the private sector of the economy for many years. The
reasons for the development of the various types of multi-bargaining
17
"Regional, Statewide Bargaining Advocated for School Negotiations,"
PERB News, Vol. 3, No. 9 (September 1970), p. 1.
18
LMRS Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 12 (December 1971), p. 3.
9structures vary from industry to industry in the private sector. Some-
times the union is responsible for its adoption; other times it is the
employer who takes the initiative. Generally speaking it is the desire
to "remove wages from competition" that motivates unions to seek multi-
employer bargaining relationships. This is particularly true in those
industries that are labor intensive and where wages account for a sig-
nificant portion of the total cost of the product. Employers have
supported multi-unit bargaining because it gives them protection against
losses from strikes. In such industries as transportation, building
construction, or retail trade, a union can strike each firm individually.
However, when employers form a common front, the union power is blunted
because a strike means a strike for the entire industry. In an
industry-wide strike it means a loss of employment to all union members,
and no one employer benefits from a strike against other employers.
Still another reason why both unions and employers in the private
sector prefer multi-unit bargaining is that it simplifies contract
negotiation and administration. It enables professionals to be utilized
by both sides. More expert attention can be focused upon complex issues
unique to the industry. In addition, unions like multi-unit bargaining
because it makes it more difficult for a rival union to gain a foothold
J 19in the industry.
For a detailed summary of multi-employer bargaining in the private
sector refer to: Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup , Economics
of Labor Relations (Homewood, Illinois: R.ichard D. Irwin, Inc. ,
1969)
,
pp. 204-226.
10
While multi-employer bargaining in the public sector is common in
20
a few other countries, it is rare in this country. There is only one
recorded example of a successful multi-employer bargaining relationship
in the public sector in the United States. This is the so-called
21
"Minnesota Experience."
Minnesota Experience . In a definitive study, David Norrgard has
described the evolution of multi-employer bargaining between the Minne-
sota Twin City Metropolitan Area Managers Association (MAMA) and the
22
International Union of Operating Engineers (IU0E)
,
Local 49, AFL-CIO.
The central theme of this study is that an increase in population in the
Twin Cities area resulted in the demand for increased local services.
This, in turn, resulted in larger public employment and the eventual
adoption of a city manager form of administration. With the tendency
toward impersonality in employment practices, unionism flourished, and
IU0E, Local 49 emerged as the dominant voice among municipal employees
in the area.
England and British Columbia have multi-employer collective bargain-
ing. The uniqueness of their industrial relations systems limits
their applicability in this country. For example, over 90% of Bri-
tish municipal employees are unionized, and the Terms and Conditions
Act Requires that once a majority of public or private employees in
a geographic area are observing a given wage rate, all employers are
required to pay that wage rate. Sam Zagoria, "British Multi-Employer
Bargaining Works," LMRS Newsletter , Vol. 2, No. 12, (Dec. 1971).
David L. Norrgard, "The Minnesota Experience," LMRS Bulletin , No. 10,
pp. 1-10.
22
Ibid.
11
Starting in the mid-1950s the city managers in the Twin Cities area
began meeting occasionally for lunch to explore common problems of
electric and gas regulation, sewage treatment, and questions of salaries
and wages of public employees. Larkin McLellan, business agent for
Local 49, in an attempt to lessen the demands of his office (he was re-
quired to travel throughout a large geographic area and make nearly
identical presentations in a compressed time period, often 15 to 20
hours a day)
,
began attending these luncheons and explaining his Union's
demands to the assembled managers. Through the next several years a
ritual was established regarding these meetings. McLellan and his asso-
ciates would attend what had now become regularly scheduled meetings of
the city managers, and make a preliminary presentation of the Union's
demands. It was believed that if the managers were briefed on the Union
positions, they would be better prepared in presenting their budget pro-
posals to the city councils.
After several years of such experience, the managers and the Union
began to exchange formal written opinions. These were reported back to
the respective parent bodies in the form of recommended settlements.
This was later expanded to include "informal, non-binding agreements"
between the managers and the union officials. These non-binding agree-
ments were usually accepted by the respective city councils, and for-
malized into a collective agreement.
In 1967 Professor Cyrus Smythe of the University of Minnesota was
retained to assist the 1IAMA in establishing a more formalized multi-
employer bargaining relationship. Drawing upon his experience as a
12
negotiator in the private sector, Professor Smythe was able to assist
the parties in establishing the existing bargaining relationship. Under
his guidance the two core cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, seven
counties and 133 cities and villages have established a viable multi-
employer bargaining relationship.
Drawing upon his intimate knowledge of the successful Minnesota
Experience, Professor Smythe has identified several "pre-conditions"
for the successful establishment of a multi-employer collective bargain-
23ing relationship in the public sector. According to Professor Smythe,
the probabilities of successful multi-employer collective bargaining
are greatest if:
1. The employers are similar in terms of the level of government
within a given geographic region;
2. The employers are similar in terms of their legal authority to
implement settlements;
3. The employers are similar in terms of their financial re-
sources ;
4. The employers are similar in their attitudes towards unions;
5. The employers are committed to the logic of establishing and
maintaining equal wages, hours and benefits of a major nature
between the various employers within a geographic region for
similar categories of employees;
23
Cyrus F. Smythe, Jr., "Public-Private Sector Multi-Employer Collec-
tive Bargaining: The Role of the Employer Representative, Unpub-
lished Working Paper, dated June, 1971, pp. 18-20.
13
6. The same union organization has bargaining rights in similar
bargaining units with the separate employers;
7. The employers compete in the same labor markets;
8. The union has a desire to equalize the major conditions of
employment in their separate bargaining relationships within
a geographic region; and
9. The individual political units have a professional full-time
management — city manager, school superintendent, or county
manager.
According to Smythe, "(t)o the extent that these conditions are not
all met, the probabilities of a constructive multi-employer unit being
2 A
established and maintained are reduced." And, "the relationship can
endure only as long as the communities, the employees, and the union
25
continue to perceive that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages."
Furthermore, once multi-bargaining has been established the onus is
placed on both the employer group and the union representatives "to
prove to their constituencies that the multi-employer approach is a more
satisfactory approach than the constant previous problems of one-
26
upmanship and/or down-manship .
"
Cyrus F. Smythe, Jr., "Public-Private Sector Multi-Employer Collec-
tive Bargaining: The Role of the Employer Representative," Unpub-
lished Working Paper, dated June, 1971, p. 19.
25
Ibid.
,
26
Ibid.
p . 14.
14
Region-Wide Collective Bargaining jn Public Education
. The chain-
of-events leading up to this report are as follows. On January 23,
1968, the Massachusetts Board of Education appointed a group of 15 per-
sons to its newly created Task Force on Collective Bargaining. These
persons were selected on the basis of their expertise in the areas of
public education and labor relations. This Task Force had been created
as a result of numerous petitions to the Department of Education request-
ing the Department's assistance in resolving the major problems surfacing
in the area of collective bargaining in the public schools. The func-
tions of the Task Force were "to examine the problems associated with
27
Chapter 763 of the Acts of 1965 (the Teacher Bargaining Statute)."
2 8
The problems to be explored consisted of:
(t)he question of what is negotiable, what constitutes
a condition of employment, a study of current impasses, the
viability of fact-finding, periods of necessary adjustment
under collective bargaining, sample contracts, the diverse
needs of teaching and administrative personnel, grievance
procedures, binding and/cr compulsory arbitration, the Com-
monwealth's role and other pertinent subjects.
After a year's deliberation, the Task Force issued a definitive
report entitled, "Report of the Task Force on Collective Bargaining in
Public Education to the Massachusetts Board of Education." This report
Letter of appointment to Professor Friedmand, Assistant Director of
the Labor Relations and Research Center, University of Massachusetts
from Mr. Owne B. Kiernan, Commissioner of Education for the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, dated January 23, 1968.
28
Ibid.
15
was to become the basis for a manual entitled, A Guide to Collective
Bargaining in the Public Schools of Massachusetts
.
The Task Force remained inactive until 1970 when Neil Sullivan,
Commissioner of Education, reconvened it "to consider the possibility
of bargaining with cities and towns on a county basis in order to save
30time of the school committees, teachers and negotiators." Initially
Worcester County was to serve as the "pilot county" for multi-employer
bargaining in the public schools; however, the county-wide approach was
later abandoned in favor of a "region-wide" pilot program. The ulti-
mate decision was to focus on the five towns comprising School Union
31
No. 64. This particular regional area seemed most receptive to the
introduction of "regional negotiations": the Massachusetts Teachers
Association had locals in each of the local schools; the communities
were of the same approximate size and ethnic background; and, perhaps
most importantly, the parties (board members and teacher organization
officials) had indicated an interest in such a proposal. It thus appeared
Massachusetts Department of Education, A Guide to Collective Bargain-
ing in the Public Schools of Massachusetts (Boston: 1969).
Letter to Task Force members from Commissioner Sullivan dated June 11,
1970. An accompanying memorandum stated that "Commissioner Sullivan
has offered this process as an alternative to the hundreds-of-
thousands of man hours expended by school committees, administrators,
and teacher organizations on professional negotiations during the
past year."
The five towns are : Holden, Paxton, Princeton, Rutland, and Sterxing.
Each community has a local school board for grades K-8. There is a
regional board for grades 9-12. The five K-8 grades comprise School
Union No. 64. Reference to School Union No. 64 is understood to in-
clude the Wachusett Regional School District.
16
that the cards were stacked in favor of establishing multi-unit collec-
tive bargaining.
An initial exploratory meeting was held in Auburn, Massachusetts
on July 29, 1970 between the Task Force and representatives of the seve-
ral local and regional school committees. The Task Force explained the
concept of multi-employer bargaining and attempted to persuade the
board members to adopt it in Union No. 64. A second exploratory meet-
ing was held in Auburn on December 3, 1970 between the Task Force and
state and local representatives of the Massachusetts Teachers Associa-
tion. The results of these two meetings are explained in detail later
in this study.
It was at this second meeting that the researcher offered his as-
sistance in analyzing the several existing board-union labor agreements
for purposes of identifying areas of commonality around which a "master"
labor agreement might be negotiated. This offer was immediately accep-
ted. An analysis was made, and a preliminary report was delivered to a
joint Union-Regional school board meeting in Holden in October of 1971.
The results of this analysis appear later in this study.
Purpose of the Study . Today, despite the efforts of the Depart-
ment of Education, the parties appear no closer to adopting some form
of region-wide collective bargaining than they were in 1970; and, al-
though Union No. 64 appeared to be an ideal region within which to es-
tablish multi-board collective bargaining, for all practical purposes,
the Task Force’s efforts have met with failure. While it would appear
that regional collective bargaining is desirable, the question arises
17
is it feasible? This study is directed toward the question of the
feasibility of establishing region-wide collective bargaining in School
Union No. 64.
Methodology of the Study
The methodology utilized in this study is threefold: the inves-
tigator has explored current literature on the subject, of multi-employer
bargaining in the public sector of the economy; he has examined the
five communities' socio-economic data; and, he has used questionnaires
and interviews to depict the attitudes of the key actors toward the con-
32
cept of region-wide collective bargaining.
Literature
. This study has been hampered by a paucity of informa-
tion on multi-employer bargaining in the public sector. While there is
ample information available on multi-unit bargaining in the private
sector, it is not generally relevant for the purposes of this study.
For example, the motivation (competition) that led private employees to
adopt this multi-unit approach does not exist in the public sector. In
the public sector employers do not fear being forced out of business by
The principle sources of information have been the Massachusetts
Department cf Education, the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the
Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development, the Office of
the Superintendent of Schools for School Union No. 64, and the indi-
vidual board and association officials. This has been supplemented
with consultations with recognized experts in the fields of labor
relations, labor law, and public school administration.
18
rival firms, and public employees (at least until recent years) did not
fear being laid off due to a deficiency in demand for their services.
33In addition to Norrgard's "Minnesota Experience," the remaining
literature on multi-employer bargaining in the public sector consists
3A
of: Ten Haken's Regional Negotiations
; Doherty's Multi-Employer Bar-
35 36gaining in Education ; Gundermann's Multi-Employer Bargaining ; and,
37
Smythe's Public-Private Sector Multi-Employer Collective Bargaining .
Questionnaire . A questionnaire was constructed and administered
to both board and teacher organization officials in an effort to deter-
mine their attitudes toward the concept of region-wide collective bar-
gaining in School Union No. 64. The questionnaire consisted of two
parts. The first part contained a semantic differential developed by
the team of Osgood, Susi, and Tannenbaum. " They had established the
33
34
35
36
37
38
Norrgard, loc. cit .
Richard E. Ten Haken, Regional Negotiations . A paper presented at
the New York State School Board's Convention at Syracuse, New York
on October 26, 1970.
Robert Doherty, Multi-Employer Bargaining in Education: Prospects
and Problems
,
an unpublished manuscript.
Neil M. Gundermann, "Multi-Employer Bargaining: For and Against,"
LMRS Newsletter
,
Vol. 2, No. 9, (September 1970).
Smythe, loc. cit .
C. E. Osgood, G. Susi, and P. Tannenbaum, The Measurement or
Meanings ^Urbania: University of Illinois Press, 196/).
19
reliability of their instrument through numerous and exhaustive tests.
The semantic differential utilized in this study consisted of eight key
phrases relating to the concept of regional negotiations. Under each
phrase were arranged fourteen scales. These scales were chosen in ac-
cordance with the following logic. Osgood, et al., utilizing the
Thurstone Controidal Factor Analysis Method, discovered a means of de-
termining which items (i.e., "good" vs. "bad") were most useful in de-
veloping semantic differential instruments. They found that certain
words (factors) were identifiable as "evaluative" factors, as "potency"
factors, and as "activity" factors. In designing the semantic differ-
ential, only those factors with a "loading" of .75 or higher were used.
To provide even greater reliability, all of the .75 or higher "evalua-
tive" factors in their Table of Rotated Factors Loading Analysis were
used.
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of two open-ended
questions designed to elicit each party's response to two questions.
These questions were designed to reveal (1) what was perceived to be the
principle advantages and/or disadvantages of region-wide collective bar-
gaining; and (2) would the board (union) constituents support the con-
cept of regional collective bargaining. The results of the question-
naires are explained in Chapter III.
Interviews . The investigator has conducted interviews with the key
participants in the existing collective bargaining relationships in
School Union No. 64. The general thrust of these interviews has been to
expand upon the above two questions, and to have the interviewees
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describe their respective communities and organizations. The results of
these interviews are explored in depth in Chapter III.
Design of the Study
. The design of this study is as follows. Gi-
ven the Department of Education’s unsuccessful efforts to persuade the
local boards and local associations to join for purposes of negotiating
a single, master agreement, the investigator has attempted to determine
whether regional negotiations are feasible in School Union No. 64.
To determine this feasibility, the researcher has drawn upon Pro-
fessor Smythe's "preconditions" for successful multi-employer bargaining
relationships. The communities, both singularly and as a group, have
been analyzed with reference to these preconditions. While the re-
searcher could answer in the affirmative to most of the preconditions,
there were some that required closer examination. Where this has oc-
curred, an in-depth analysis has followed.
Referring back to Smythe's preconditions, we find that the local
boards are at the same level of government; they dn possess equal con-
tractual powers; they d£ employ a common professional administrator;
and, the same classes of employees are represented by the same union.
The question of feasibility hinges upon three important preconditions:
first, whether the local communities are financially able to participate
second, whether the parties actually want to participate; and, finally,
whether the parties can legally participate. A chapter has been de-
voted to the exploration of each of these key questions. Obviously, if
the parties are either unable (legally or fiscally) or unwilling to par-
ticipate the probability of establishing regional negotiations will be
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very low - if not impossible.
Assuming for the moment that the preconditions are all met, the
related question arises as to the relative ease with which the existing
labor agreements can be "blended" into a single, all-inclusive master
labor agreement. This question is explored in Chapter III.
Thus, the design of this study has been: first, to determine the
fiscal compatability of the five communities; second, to assess their
attitudes toward regional negotiations; and third, to explore the lega-
lity of such a joint venture.
Limitations of the Study . The limitations of a study of this na-
ture are many. That which follows represents what are perceived to be
the major limitations: first, the scarcity of related research infor-
mation from which may be obtained certain benchmarks for guidance;
second, the lack of community economic and social data that is both cur-
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rent and in a form appropriate for comparative purposes; third, the
necessity of treating key social, economic, and political variables as
independent of one another; fourth, the general reluctance on the part
of key individuals to cooperate in supplying both factual and opinionated
data; and finally, the researcher’s ability to interpret the subjective
and/or perceptual responses to the interviews and questionnaires. Given
these, and other limitations, the researcher nevertheless believes that
^
The economic data utilized in this study is for the 1970-71 school
year. More recent data is not available in sufficient quantities for
utilization. Despite the fact that some of this information is now
dated, the researcher believes that it has not changed sufficiently
to alter the conclusions of the study.
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a "reasonably” accurate assessment of the feasibility of introducing
region-wide collective bargaining in School Union No. 64 can be made.
And, it is further believed that the information obtained will provide
a conceptual basis for assessing the feasibility of introducing some
form of multi—employer bargaining in other areas of local government.
Underlying Assumptions
. This study is predicated upon the follow-
ing assumptions:
1. It is assumed that Professor Smythe's "preconditions" for suc-
cessful multi-employer bargaining in the public sector repre-
sent an accurate and comprehensive benchmark upon which this
study may be based;
2. It is assumed that region-wide collective bargaining will not
be feasible unless the parties are legally, financially, and
emotionally willing and able to participate;
3. It is assumed that region-wide collective bargaining will cul-
minate in a "master" agreement that will, more-or-less
,
stan-
dardize the employment throughout the communities in School
Union No. 64;
4. It is assumed that the resulting master agreement will impose
additional financial burdens upon some of the participating
communities; and,
5. It is assumed that the quantity and quality of the data is
adequate for the purposes of formulating a valid conclusion on
the feasibility of introducing a voluntary region-wide collec-
tive bargaining relationship in School Union No. 64.
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Conclusion of the Study
. Despite the existence of most of the con-
ditions considered prerequisites for the introduction of region-wide
collective bargaining, it is the investigator’s conclusion that regional
negotiations are not feasible at this time. This conclusion is based
upon the widespread reluctance of the parties (board members, voters,
and state and local association members) to participate in this joint
venture. This reluctance can be traced to their shared belief that
region-wide negotiations will improve the other side's bargaining power
at the expense of their own.
CHAPTER II
REGIONAL PROFILE: FISCAL COMPATIBILITY
It will be recalled that one of the preconditions for the success-
ful establishment of multi-employer, or region-wide, collective bar-
gaining is that the employers be similar in terms of their financial
resources. The rationale underlying this observation rests upon the
probability that regional negotiations will result in a master agree-
ment that will standardize the employment conditions throughout the
regional area at a level higher than before. Participating communities
must therefore: (1) have the financial resources to meet the required
additional expenditures, and (2) have the willingness to utilize these
resources for educational purposes. Thus, a consideration of fiscal
compatibility evolves around two related factors: fiscal capacity and
fiscal effort. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a compara-
tive analysis of the five communities’ ability to finance the terms of
the proposed master agreement.
As has been stated, region-wide collective bargaining may be ex-
pected to culminate in a master labor agreement that will standardize
employment conditions throughout the regional area. Indeed, it is the
very prospect of standardization that has provided the major impetus for
exploring region-wide collective bargaining as an alternative to the
present system of bargaining. In addition to alleviating the inefficien-
cies inherent in negotiating and administering several agreements, both
parties can benefit in other respects. For example, it may be argued
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that the local associations stand to benefit through the greater ser-
vices that the state organization will be able to provide. The state
organization will benefit through strengthening the locals thereby
eliminating potential rival unions. The boards would, of course, bene-
fit by being removed from the locals’ bargaining tactics of playing one
local board against another (whipsawing).
While the exact terms of the proposed master agreement are logi-
cally indeterminant, it is reasonable to expect that the terms may be
such as to require seme participating communities to appropriate addi-
tional tax revenues. This added cost could result from an increase in
either the level or scope of the contract subject matter.
With respect to the level at which the employment conditions might
become standardized in a master agreement, it is only reasonable to ex-
pect that the teacher representatives will seek to include all of the
"better" provisions of the existing local agreements in the new master
agreement; likewise, it may also be reasonably assumed that the board's
representatives will attempt to incorporate those provisions found in
the "poorer" agreements. The resulting level at which the employment
conditions will become standardized will be a function of the parties'
relative bargaining power. However, as unions are known for clinging
tenaciously to what they have obtained in the past, it becomes extremely
doubtful if they would (or could) accept a settlement at a level less
than they had previously negotiated.
An increase in the scope of bargainable subjects could also be
expected to impose added financial burdens on the participating
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communities. The Massachusetts municipal bargaining statute defines as
mandatory bargaining subjects, "wages, hours and other conditions of
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employment. It is the latter part of this trilogy that requires
special attention because it is this that has been instrumental in ex-
panding the scope of bargaining subjects in the private sector.
Other conditions may be interpreted as to include many or few
subjects. While the school boards understandably prefer that the phrase
be interpreted in the narrowest possible manner, the teachers obviously
prefer to have it interpreted to include virtually all aspects of public
education. As the Massachusetts Labor P,elation Commission hears charges
of unfair labor practices resulting, in part, from the refusal of one
side to discuss particular subjects, it becomes useful to look to it for
a prediction on whether the scope of bargainable subjects will expand
in the future. And, as the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission
looks to decisions from the private sector for precedent, it may be ex-
pected that the scope of bargainable subjects will expand in the public
sector as it has in the private sector. Commissioner Stephen McCloskey,
in a reply to a question on "what is negotiable," offered the following
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answer
:
Chapter 763 of the Acts of 1965, amending Section 178 of Chapter 149
of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Letter from Labor Relations Commissioner, Stephen McCloskey, to Dr.
William Wallace, Chairman of the Department of Education Task Force
on Collective Bargaining, dated August 14, 1968.
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(E)xtra pay for extra duty, level of professional
preparation, credit for prior service, in-service edu-
cation, discharge procedure, preparation periods,
transfer policy, class size, duty-free lunch, grie-
vance procedures, salaries, check-off, sick leave,
teachers evaluation, consultation with Superintendent,
school meetings, sabbatical leave, hospital and medi-
cal care. Also, full participation by the teacher
organizations as to the top policy-making with manage-
ment groups. ...there is nothing that should be
standardized to the point that there is no fluidness
to operate. All issues should be flexible, although
some minimum type of standards should be kept. There
is nothing as permanent as change and here it is
.
(italics added)
It would thus appear that communities who are similar in fiscal
ability would have less difficulty in establishing and maintaining re-
gional negotiations than would communities with substantial differences.
It seems only plausible that there exists a direct relationship between
the degree of community fiscal compatibility and the probability of
introducing region-wide collective bargaining.
The question now arises as to how do you determine relative fiscal
compatibility. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring
this question. Because fiscal compatibility involves a consideration
of a community's financial resources (fiscal capacity), and their willing-
ness to use them (fiscal effort)
,
these two topics will be explored sepa-
rately.
Regional Profile: Fiscal Capacity
Individual community statistics gathered for this study make it
possible to analyze existing disparities between each of the five commu-
nities comprising School Union No. 64. Although a community s equalized
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property valuation per school attending child is generally regarded as
the principle index of a local community’s ability to pay, the researcher
has elected to supplement this one index with two complimentary indexes:
general net debt as a percent of equalized property valuation; and, per-
cent of school attending children in public school membership. These
latter two indexes are introduced to correct for possible errors or dis-
crepancies inherent in the former index.
Equalized Property Valuation per School Attending Child (EPV/SAC)
.
EPV/SAC is widely regarded as the principle measure of a community’s
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ability to support its schools. “ This method reflects the size of the
tax base available for local property taxation on an equalized basis.
It utilizes the local property as the tax base because, for all practi-
cal purposes, local property is the tax base for generating educational
revenues
.
EPV/SAC is an extremely useful tool for determining relative local
community fiscal capacity because it "equalizes” the property values in
each community according to some fixed ratio to full market value for
the state as a whole.
The adequacy of EPV/SAC as a measure of relative community capacity
to finance the public schools is affected by the community's requirements
See for example, Paul R. Mort, Walter C. Reusser, and John W. Polley,
Public School Finance: Its Background, Structure and Operation (New
York: 3rd ed.
,
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 115-123; R. L. Johns,
"Indirect Measures of Local Ability to Support Schools Trends in
Financing Public Education , Proceedings of the Eighth National Con-
ference on School Finance, Committee on Educational Finance; and,
Steven J. Weiss, Existing Disparities in Public School Finance and
Proposals for Reform , Research Report No. -46 (Boston: Federal Re-
serve Bank, February, 1970).
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to finance non-school programs, and by the fact that local property
valuations are not kept up to date as improvements are made. Given
these limitations, the EPV/SAC does, nevertheless, provide a useful
device for comparing and contrasting relative community fiscal capacity.
The EPV/SAC index is determined by dividing a community's aggre-
gate equalized property valuation by all school-aged children residing
iti the community. A school attending child may be defined as any minor
child in any school (K-12) who resides in the local community as re-
ported by the superintendent of schools on October 1st of the school
year
.
Table I summarizes the EPV/SAC data for each of the five communi-
ties represented in School Union No. 64. For ease of presentation and
comprehension, the statistical data has been arranged in the following
manner: each community's EPV/SAC has been expressed as a dollar amount;
next it has been expressed as a percent of the region's average; and,
finally it has been represented diagrarcmatically through the use of a
bar diagram. To further aid in comparing and contrasting fiscal capaci-
ty, the mean, mean deviation, and range for the regional EPV/SAC has
been computed and offered. This same statistical approach has been
utilized throughout this section.
The data in Table I suggest that there exist no "significant" dif-
ferences in the communities' EPV/SAC. They appear to be in a closely
ranked order with Holden having the largest EPV/SAC and Princeton the
smallest. The EPV/SACs of the remaining communities range between these
two extremes. The EPV/SAC mean deviation from the regional average is
about $2,100.00.
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TABLE I
EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUATION PER SCHOOL-ATTENDING CHILD: 1970
(EPV/SAC)*
COMMUNITIES EPV/SAC ($) % REGIONAL X
HOLDEN $ 19,692 114.8%
PAXTON 15,106 88.0%
PRINCETON 13,944 81.3%
RUTLAND 19,364 113.9%
STERLING 17,652 102.9%
MEAN 17,156 100.0%
MEAN DEVIATION 2,100
RANGE 5,748
EPV/SAC as a % Regional X
Source: State Department of Education, Analysis of School Aid to
Massachusetts Cities and Towns: Chapter 70 Amended, Distribution
Years 1970-1971 . Boston: State Department of Education, 1971.
* Dollar values have been rounded to the nearest dollar; all
percentages have been computed to the nearest tenth of a percent.
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General Net Debt as a Percent of Equalized Property Valuation
. As
was mentioned earlier, the adequacy of EPV/SAC as an index of relative
ability to finance a given level of educational expenditures is affected
by a community's prior obligations to appropriate tax revenues to finance
public, non-school connected programs. General net debt as a percent of
equalized property valuation (GND/EPV) has been utilized as a means for
correcting for this limitation on EPV/SAC. It is obvious that if two
communities have the same EPV/SAC, but one has a high ratio of GND/EPV,
this latter community may be considered less able to finance its public
schools than the former community.
The data offered in Table II follows the same format as that estab-
lished in Table I. The information is presented both on a community-to-
community basis, then as a percent of the regional average. The extent
of the similarities and/or differences are represented pictorially by
a bar graph. Excluded from the GND/EPV are community debts for such
self-liquidating municipal projects as water works, sewage treatment,
and municipal lighting projects.
It is apparent from the information presented that significant vari-
ations do exist in the five communities' GND/EPV. Holden, which had the
highest EPV/SAC, has the distinction of having the next to lowest GND/
EPV. Princeton, on the other hand, has a GND/EPV ratio about five times
as great as that of Holden, and about ten times as great as that of
Sterling. As the bar diagram clearly depicts, it is Princeton that clear-
ly stands out in the group as the one community with the greatest non-
school financial commitment.
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TABLE II
GENERAL NET DEBT AS A PERCENT OF EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUATION: 1970
(GND/EPV)*
COMMUNITIES GND/EPV (%) % REGIONAL X
HOLDEN 2.40% 53.5%
PAXTON 4.69% 104.5%
PRINCETON 10.26% 228.5%
RUTLAND 4.14% 92.2%
STERLING 1
. 30% 30.0%
MEAN 4.48% 100.0%
MEAN DEVIATION 2.32%
RANGE 8.96%
HOLDEN PAXTON PRINCETON RUTLAND STERLING
GND/EPV as a % Regional X
Source: Massachusetts Teachers Association, 1970 Background Data and
Profile Sheets for Comparing School Districts in Respect to Payment of
Adequate Salaries to Teachers: Part I
,
Research Bulletin No. 701-9.
* All percentages have been rounded to the nearest tenth of a
percent
.
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Percent of School Attending Children in Public School Membership
(SAC/PSM) . The SAC/PSM ratio is offered to correct an additional limi-
tation on the EPV/SAC index as a measure of a community's capacity to
finance the public schools. It will be recalled that a "school attend-
ing child" is any minor child in "any” school in the local community as
reported by the superintendent of schools. To accurately reflect the
community's capacity to pay, consideration must be given to the public
funds required to support the education of children actually in the pub-
lic schools of that community. For example, two communities may have
approximately the same EPV/SAC and GND/EPV; but one of them may have 99%
of its children in its public schools, whereas the other may have only
75% of its children in its public schools. It would be inaccurate to
equate these two communities in terms of fiscal capacity to support
their public schools. The latter community would obviously have greater
fiscal capacity.
The relevant SAC/PSM statistical data is summarized in Table III.
Employing the same format as that utilized in the previous two tables,
it may be observed that there are no considerable differences between
the five communities. Paxton appears to be the "best" off with only
86% of its children actually in attendance in the public schools.
Princeton, on the other hand, once again has the dubious honor of ranking
lowest of the group.
Let us pause now and survey the findings thus far. It appears from
the statistical data assembled that, with the exception of Princeton,
there is relatively little difference in the communities' fiscal capacity
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TABLE III
% OF SCHOOL-ATTENDING CHILDREN IN PUBLIC SCHOOL MEMBERSHIP: 1970
COMMUNITIES
(SAC/PSM)*
SAC/PSM (%) % REGIONAL :
HOLDEN 90.0% 99.3%
PAXTON 86.0% 94.9%
PRINCETON 94.0% 103.8%
RUTLAND 91.0% 100.4%
STERLING 92.0% 101.5%
MEAN 90.6% 100.0%
MEAN DEVIATION 1.6%
RANGE 8.0%
HOLDEN PAXTON PRINCETON RUTLAND STERLING
SAC/PSM as a % of Regional X
Source: Massachusetts Teachers Association, 1970 Background Data and
Profile Sheets for Comparing School Districts in Respect to Payment of
Adequate Salaries to Teachers: Part I , Research Bulletin No. 701-9.
* All percentages have been rounded to the nearest tenth of a
percent.
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to support their public schools. Generally speaking, it is Holden and
Rutland that rank highest in terms of fiscal capacity. Sterling and
Paxton appear about equal with respect to their fiscal capacity. There
appears to be no pattern between the communities' relative ranking with
respect to the three indexes: while Holden ranks highest in EPV/SAC,
it ranks fourth in SAC/PSM; Rutland ranks second in EPV/SAC and third
in GND/EPV; and Paxton and Sterling "float" around the group average.
It is only Princeton that is consistent in its relative ranking and it
has consistently been ranked last by each of the indexes. Princeton has
the lowest equalized property valuation per school attending child, the
highest percent of net debt to equalized property valuation, and the
highest percent of its children attending its public supported schools.
Before we make any premature judgements regarding Princeton's fis-
cal ability to participate in regional negotiations, let us now consider
the second facet of fiscal ability - community willingness to utilize
its resources for educational purposes.
Regional Profile: Fiscal Effort
A community's relative willingness to utilize its limited resources
to support its public schools is evidenced by the fiscal actions of the
local school committee. In Massachusetts the local school boards have
fiscal autonomy. If after having followed appropriate procedures, a lo-
cal school board deems that certain funds are necessary for the support
of the public schools, but the community (city council or town meeting)
refuses to appropriate these funds, a suit may be brought in equity in
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superior court against the community. The court may order the community
to appropriate the necessary funds together with a "deficiency" judge—
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ment of twenty-five percent.
When a local board exercises its fiscal autonomy, it presumably does
so after having made an assessment of (1) the community's fiscal capacity
to pay, and (2) the relative value the community places upon education.
Although the local board does possess a degree of fiscal autonomy that
can permit it to act contrary to the desires of a majority of the voters
in the short run, it is doubtful that it can continue to impose its will
over that of the voters in the long run. The information that follows
reflects the local boards' assessments of their respective communities'
capacity and willingness to finance their public schools.
Generally speaking, the "basic" school tax is the most widely uti-
lized index of a community's local willingness to support its public
schools. For purposes of comparison, this study has utilized the equal-
ized school tax rate as the principle measurement of local willingness
or effort. This index has been supplemented by statistical data on com-
munity school taxes as a percent of total local expenditures, and com-
munity per pupil expenditures (K-12) for students in net average member-
ship .
Equalized School Tax Rate . The equalized school tax rate is the
amount of tax revenues appropriated per thousand dollars of taxable
property expressed as a ratio to full market value. Before examining
43
Section 34, Chapter 71, as amended by Chapter 292, L. 1939 of the
General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
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the data, a word of caution is perhaps in order. The ESTR data should
not be viewed by itself because it can easily be misinterpreted. For
example, if a given community exhibits a relatively low ESTR, it cannot
be concluded that the community does not place a high value on public
education and are thus unwilling to appropriate the necessary revenues.
This is by no means a necessary implication; the ESTR may be low because
of purely fortuitous reasons : the community may be lucky enough to con-
tain valuable property with few students attached; it may have a high
proportion of families sending their children to private schools; or,
it simply may not have the fiscal capacity to support a higher ESTR.
In fact, it is possible that a low ESTR may support excellent schools;
unfortunately the obverse is also true.
Utilizing the format previously established. Table IV presents the
ESTR for the five communities. The average for the region is $22.17 and
the mean deviation is $2.18. Although Rutland has the highest ESTR
($24.56) and Paxton has the lowest ESTR ($17.90), there does not appear
to be too great a variation between the communities. Princeton, which
it may be recalled had ranked lowest in all indexes of fiscal capacity,
appears to be making an effort that closely approximates that of the
group average.
School Tax Rate as a Percent of Total Local Taxes . The second sta-
tistical index of community effort is the school tax rate as a percent
of total local taxes (STR/TLT) . The STR/TLT data is offered to partially
explain the relative levels of equalized school taxes. It may be assumed
that the local school boards based their fiscal actions upon their
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TABLE IV
EQUALIZED SCHOOL TAX RATE: 1970(ESTR)* *
COMMUNITIES ESTR ($) % REGIONAL X
HOLDEN $24.56 110.7%
PAXTON 17.90 80.7%
PRINCETON 21.51 97.0%
RUTLAND 26.82 121.0%
STERLING 20.08 90.6%
MEAN 22.17 100.0%
MEAN DEVIATION 2.81
RANGE 8.92
ESTR as a % of Regional X
Source: Massachusetts Teachers Association, 1970 Background Data and
Profile Sheets for Comparing School Districts in Respect to Payment of
Adequate Salaries to Teachers: Part I , Research Bulletin No. 701-9.
The "Equalized School Tax Rate" is approximately what the 1970 "Offi-
cial School Tax Rate" would have been if it had been based on the 1968
equalized valuation rather than the 1970 assessed valuation; Ibid . , p. 1.
* All percentages have been rounded to the nearest tenth of a per-
cent .
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assessment of local willingness and capacity to support the public
schools, and that the percentage of local tax dollars currently earmarked
for public education reflects the boards’ assessments.
Table V presents a capsulated view of the five communities' STR/TLT.
Regarding the assembled data, two comments are in order: first, there is
relatively little variation between the communities' STR/TLT ratios; and
second, Princeton's fiscal effort again closely approximates the group's
average.
Per Pupil Expenditures in Net Average Membership . Per pupil expen-
ditures in net average membership (PPE/NAM) express the dollar amount
spent by a local community on a net per pupil basis for educational pur-
poses in grades K-12. It is "net" because an allowance has been made for
the number of tuition paying non-resident students attending the local
schools as opposed to the tuition payments the town must pay to send Id-
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cal children to other school districts. PPE/NAM thus represents a
fairly accurate description of local efforts as depicted by actual per
pupil expenditures.^
"The net average membership in the public day schools of a town for
any school year shall be the average membership for such year as shown
by the school registers, increased by the number of pupils resident
therein whose tuition in the public schools of another town, for not
less than half such year, the town has paid, decreased by the number
of non-resident pupils attending its schools for not less than half
such year." Department of Education, loc . cit . , p. 9.
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Massachusetts had (1970) a school aid program that was an adaptation
of the "preferred percentage equalizing model." This program has been
described by some as a "grotesque example of a labyrinthian system
that almost defies comprehension, not to mention concise description
(Weiss, loc . cit .
,
p. 16). State aid consists of a partial . reimburse-
ment of school expenditures on a percentage basis on a sliding scale
according to the relative valuation per child in the school district.
Percentages run from 15 to 25 percent.
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TABLE V
SCHOOL TAX RATE AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL LOCAL TAXES- 1970
(STR/TLT)*
COMMUNITIES STR/TLT (%) 2 REGIONAL X
HOLDEN 68.0% 106.6%
PAXTON 63.0% 98.7%
PRINCETON 60.0% 94.0%
RUTLAND 71.0% 111.3%
STERLING 57.0% 89.3%
MEAN 63.8% 100.0%
MEAN DEVIATION 4.8%
RANGE 4.0%
Source: Massachusetts Teachers Association, 1970 Background Data and
Profile Sheets for Comparing School District Data in Respect to Payment
of Adequate Salaries to Teachers: Part I
,
Research Bulletin 701-9.
* All percentages have been rounded to the nearest tenth of a
percent
.
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Table VI compares and contrasts the PPE/NAM statistical data for
each of the five towns under study. As is shown, the mean for the group
is $795.60, and the average deviation is $76.62. There exists a $350.00
range between the highest (Sterling) and the lowest (Paxton) PPE/NAM for
the region. Princeton’s PPE/NAM is slightly above the regional average.
Let us pause at this point and recapitulate. It will be recalled
that the primary purpose of this chapter has been to determine relative
community fiscal compatibility. Relative community fiscal compatibility
is considered to be a necessary prerequisite for the successful introduc-
tion and maintenance of multi-employer bargaining in the public sector.
Fiscal compatibility is considered a necessary prerequisite because of
the likelihood that regional negotiations will result in a master labor
agreement which will impose additional financial obligations on some of
the participating communities. It thus appears only logical that the
greater the degree of community fiscal compatibility, the less the like-
lihood that a master agreement will be negotiated which will contain
terms that are beyond the means of the participating communities.
Relative fiscal ability is thus a function of two related variables:
community taxable base, and community willingness to tax this base for
educational purposes. When viewed in this context it is assumed that
region-wide collective bargaining may not be considered feasible if either
of these conditions exists: (1) the communities have similar fiscal
capacity, but one or more differ from the group in terms of relative
willingness to utilize its resources for educational purposes; or, (2)
the communities exhibit similar desires to support their public schools,
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TABLE VI
PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES IN NET AVERAGE MEMBERSHIP
:
1970
(PPE/NAM)*
COMMUNITIES PPE/NAM ($) 2 REGIONAL X
HOLDEN $781.00 98.0%
PAXTON 625.00 78.0%
PRINCETON 808.00 101.0%
RUTLAND 789.00 99.0%
STERLING 975.00 122.0%
MEAN 795.60 100.0%
MEAN DEVIATION 76.62
RANGE 350.00
PPE/NAM as a % of Regional X
Source: Massachusetts Teachers Association , 1970 Background Data and
Profile Sheets for Comparing School Districts in Respect to Payment of
Adequate Salaries to Teachers: Part I , Research Bulletin No. 701-9.
* All percentages have been rounted to the nearest percent.
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but one or more communities lack a sufficient level of taxable resources
from which to appropriate the desired revenues.
The evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests that
neither of these two conditions exists in the area under study. Dif-
ferences in relative community fiscal capacity do exist. Holden and
Rutland are clearly richer communities. Princeton, on the other hand,
stands out in all indexes as the "poorest" community of the group. How-
ever, when viewed with respect to the effort that a community is willing
to make in support of its public schools, Princeton’s effort either
equals or exceeds the average of the group. It is based upon this evi-
dence that the investigator concludes that the communities are fiscally
compatible for purposes of establishing regional negotiations.
Regional Profile: Economic and Demographic Characteristics
The remaining pages of this chapter have been devoted to exploring
other dimensions of community compatibility which may influence a com-
munity’s ability or desire to become involved in regional negotiations.
These dimensions are economic, political, and sociological.
Economic Base. Table VII summarizes available statistical data on
the five communities’ principle industries according to their general
industrial groupings and sources of employment. The data reveal that
Holden differs in one important respect from remaining communities: it
has a substantial portion of its firms engaged in manufacturing activi-
ties. These firms provide employment for about 40/o of the total Isdot
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TABLE VII
EMPLOYMENT BY PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES: I960
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HOLDEN
No. of Firms 4 36 10 8 48 8 37
Average // Empees. 17 188 541 37 412 20 180
% Dist. by Empees. 1.2 13.5 38.8 2.7 29.5 1.4 12.9
PAXTON
No. of Firms - 7 - 1 14 1 7
Average // Empees. - 33 - * 140 * 26
% Dist. by Empees. - 16.6 - - 70.4 - 13.0
PRINCETON
No. of Firms - 4 - 1 5 1 4
Average // Empees. - 9 - * 12 * 15
% Dist. by Empees. - 25.0 - - 33.3 - 41.7
RUTLAND
No. of Firms 2 8 6 2 14 2 8
Average # Empees. * 20 16 * 67 * 101
% Dist. by Empees. - 9.8 17.8 - 32.8 - 49.6
STERLING
No. of Firms 4 17 2 6 14 - 13
Average // Empees. 27 89 * 19 138 * 75
% Dist. by Empees. 7.8 25.5 - 5.5 39.7 - 21.5
Source: Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development. City
and Town Monograph
,
Revised July 1970 (Boston, 1970) for each of the
five towns.
* Firms included in Service Industry
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force. The only other community that has any significant number of
manufacturing firms is Rutland, but these firms only employ about 8% of
the local labor force.
Holden's remaining industrial groupings are similar to those common
to the remaining communities. These include small firms operating in
the general industrial categories of construction, service, wholesale,
and retail. Wholesale and retail firms account for about a third of the
local employment in all communities except Paxton. In Paxton these firms
account for over 70% of the total local employment. Princeton and Rutland
both have a large percentage of firms in the service industries. These
firms provide employment to about half of the local labor force. The
remaining communities have firms in the service industry, and they pro-
vide employment to between twelve and fifteen percent of their local la-
bor forces. The five towns have few, if any, firms in the industrial
categories of "agriculture and mining", and "finance and real estate".
Political Affiliation . Another variable that deserves close atten-
tion is the relative political compatibility of the five communities.
While it may not be considered to be an absolute prerequisite to the in-
troduction of regional negotiations, political compatibility certainly
The employment statistics refer to employment by "place" of employ-
ment rather than by "residence" of the labor force. While exact in-
formation is lacking, it is reported by local sources that many
residents commute to jobs in Worcester and Fitchburg. The Holden
mills also provide employment for residents of the surrounding local
communities
.
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can influence the relative ease of its introduction, and even the perma-
nence of the relationship. It requires little effort to imagine the dif-
ficulties that could be encountered in attempting to establish (not to
mention maintaining) regional negotiations if the participating communi-
ties were politically incompatible.
The 1970 voter registration statistics for each of the five towns
47
reveal the following data:
HOLDEN PAXTON PRINCETON STERLING RUTLAND REGION
Democrat 10.9% 11.5% 14.4% 11.9% 19.2% 13.6%
Republican 43.0% 24.4% 21.9% 29.4% 34 . 1% 30.6%
Unenrolled 46 . 1% 64.1% 63.7% 58.7% 45.9% 55.7%
One salient factor emerges from the above statistics; that is that
the registered republicans outnumber the democrats by a two to one ma-
jority. It also appears that a substantial block of unenrolled voters
exists who potentially can swing the vote to either party. However, as
the historical statistics have revealed, the republicans have been suc-
cessful in retaining control of the local town governments — including
the local school boards.
Population Size and Age Distribution . Table VIII summarizes the inter-
community statistical data on population size and age distributions.
These statistics have been extracted from the most recently available
47
The information contained in the above chart has been extracted from
copies of the City and Town Monograph (1970) for each of the five
towns. Information on politics is found under "Population - U. S.
Census, B-6 Politics, Party Affiliation: 1970."
TABLE VIII
POPULATION AND AGE DISTRIBUTION: 1965
POPULATION BY COMMUNITY
HOLDEN 12,564
PAXTON 3,731
PRINCETON 1,681
RUTLAND 3,198
STERLING 4,219
RANGE 10,883
MEAN 5,079
M.D
.
2,993
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY COMMUNITY (%)
Under 5 5-14 15-24 25-64 Over 65
HOLDEN 7.4 24.5 9.0 51.3 7.8
PAXTON 8.9 23.2 7.8 52.9 7.2
PRINCETON 11.1 21.0 7.5 50.2 10.2
RUTLAND 9.5 23.0 9.9 49.1 8.5
STERLING 9.4 20.0 9.4 51.4 9.8
MEAN* 9.3 22.3 8.7 50.9 8.7
Source: Massachusetts Department of Commerce and Development, C
and Town Monograph
,
Revised July 1970 (Boston, 1970). Informati
taken from each of the five town monographs.
* Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent.
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(1965) census data. It suffices to state that the unusual approach of
determining a group mean and a mean deviation will be distorted and thus
meaningless due to Holden's relatively larger population. Holden, it
will be observed, has a population that exceeds the combined populations
of the remaining four communities. If Holden were excluded, the four
remaining towns would each exhibit approximately the same size popula-
tion.
Despite the obvious difference in Holden's population size, the
census data does reveal that there exists a high degree of similarity
between the five communities' age distribution data. The extent of this
similarity is evidenced by the fact that the mean deviation for age dis-
tributions in each of the five age categories (under 5, 5-14, 15-24, 25-
64, and over 65) is approximately two percent.
The data further reveal one other area of similarity that deserves
comment. Each of the communities has a "bulge" in its age distribution
statistics in the 5-14 category. Persons in this age category comprise
a little over one-fifth of each community's total population. Data are
not available to indicate whether this bulge reflects the so-called
"baby bubble" that accompanied the termination of the Korean Conflict,
or whether it forecasts a continuing long-run increase in the community's
total populations. Whichever may be the case, an increase in population
would be expected to place added demands on an individual community's
school facilities, thereby affecting its relative ability to participate
in regional negotiations.
Summary . It has been the purpose of this chapter to determine
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whether or not the communities in the region under study are fiscally
compatible for purposes of regional negotiations. Relative ability to
pay is important because of the possibility that regional negotiations
will result in a master agreement that will, by standardizing employment
conditions throughout the region, impose additional operating costs on
some local communities. It is assumed that the closer the communities
are in terms of ability to pay for public education, the greater the
feasibility of establishing and maintaining regional negotiations. "Abi-
lity to pay" has been viewed as a function of two related variables:
community fiscal capacity (taxable base relative to educational obliga-
tion)
,
and willingness to levy taxes to appropriate revenues for the sup-
port of the public schools (effort)
. The evidence assembled and pre-
sented supports the following generalizations:
1. The five communities are relatively similar in ability
to pay for their public schools. While Princeton, having
relatively less fiscal capacity, makes an effort to ap-
propriate revenues that equal or exceed the group’s average;
and
,
2. While not considered as pre-conditions, the five communities
also exhibit a high degree of similarity in three other
important areas: political affiliation, economic base,
and demographic characteristics. It is expected that
community compatibility in these areas would have a favor-
able influence upon the introduction and maintenance of
regional negotiations.
CHAPTER III
REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: CONTRACTUAL DIMENSIONS
It will be recalled that one of the preconditions necessary for
the successful introduction and maintenance of regional negotiations
was that the parties have similar legal capacity to enter into the pro-
posed bargaining relationship. This chapter will concern itself with
this and another closely related question: assuming that the local
boards do have the legal capacity to enter into regional negotiations,
the question arises as to how easy it will be to combine the existing
labor agreements into one, all-inclusive master labor agreement.
Contractual Capacity
As has previously been stated, the introduction of region-wide
collective bargaining in School Union No. 64 would be expected to cul-
minate in the negotiation of a so-called "master" labor agreement. This
master agreement would more or less standardize employment conditions
throughout the schools in the area in question. It would be up to the
parties whether they elected to negotiate an all-inclusive agreement
that was binding on all local boards, or whether they chose to negotiate
a master agreement covering only certain "key" items, thereby leaving
the individual local boards free to negotiate with their local associ-
ation representatives those items which are peculiar to the individual
school or community.
The mechanics of regional negotiations could approximate the
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following sequence: the local boards and teacher associations could
each select a negotiating team to represent them as a group; within the
guidelines previously established by the boards and teacher associa-
tions, these negotiators could then arrive at a tentative agreement;
and, once ratified by the participating parties, a master agreement
could be signed which would more or less standardize the employment
relationships throughout the schools in Union No. 64.
Several local board members have questioned the legality of regional
negotiations. These questions may be summarized as: (1) would re-
gional negotiations constitute an illegal delegation of the school
boards’ taxing power; and, (2) would it be an unfair labor practice for
the school boards to negotiate simultaneously with several local teacher
association representatives as opposed to individually with the recog-
nized exclusive bargaining representative.
The first question concerns itself with the issue of illegal dele-
gation of the local board’s taxing powers. The basis for this concern
is the fact that the state has granted to the local board certain
powers, one of which is the power to levy taxes for the maintenance of
the local schools. It is generally held that the board’s powers are
unique insomuch as they are quasi-legislative. Arid, as such, they can-
not be taken away, given away, or shared. To do so would constitute an
^ These concerns were expressed to the researcher by members of the
local and regional school boards at a school board meeting in Holden,
Massachusetts on October 7, 1971. The details of this meeting are
explained in Chapter IV.
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abdication of their quasi-legislative authority. The question therefore
arises whether voluntary participation in regional negotiations, that
would result in a master agreement, would constitute an illegal delega-
tion of the boards' discretionary taxing powers.
The enactment of Chapter 763 of the Acts of 1965 (municipal bar-
gaining statute) grants to certain municipal employees the right to or-
ganize and engage in collective bargaining with their public employers.
This imposes a legal obligation upon the public employer, or his desig-
nated representative (s)
,
to meet with the certified employee represen-
tatives for purposes of "good faith" negotiations. The act specifically
47
provides for school committees by stating that:
In such bargaining with an employee organization
for school employees, the municipal employer shall be
represented by the school committee or its designated
representative or representatives (italics added)
;
provided however, that the school committee shall not
designate an attorney as its representative unless it
is so authorized by vote of the city council, in the
case of a city, or of the town meeting, in the case
of a town.
The statute explicitly permits the local school boards to select
their representatives for purposes of collective negotiations. The only
explicit prohibition on the boards' selection of a bargaining represen-
48
tative concerns the employment of attorneys. The Legislature has
Section 1781 of Chapter 149 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.
In January of 1969 Attorney General Elliot Richardson rendered the
opinion that an attorney who is a member of the local board ^mav rep-
resent the local board, provided he "is not acting under a designa-
tion' but rather as part of the committee...". Opinion rendered
to
Owen Keirnan, Commissioner of Education, dated January 10,
1969.
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granted to the local board wide discretionary powers in the selection
of its bargaining representative. Within this interpretation of the
statute, it would not constitute an illegal delegation of the local
board s discretionary powers to enter into regional negotiations pro-
vided the local board retains the right to ratify the master agreement.
Two experts in labor relations in the public sector concur with
the above opinion. Stephen McCloskey, Massachusetts State Labor Rela-
tions Commissioner, at a meeting of the Task Force on Collective Bar-
gaining, expressed the opinion that school boards could legally join
for purposes of negotiating a region-wide master labor agreement.
^
Professor Harvey Friedman, Director of the Labor Relations and Research
Center at the University of Massachusetts, and also an attorney, agrees
that it is within the local board's discretionary powers to select its
own bargaining representatives, and as long as the board retains the
right to ratify the agreement, it has not delegated its discretionary
50
powers
.
In the 1951 landmark decision in the Norwalk Teachers' Case (138
Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482), the question of whether board - teacher asso-
ciation bargaining constituted an illegal delegation of the board's
49
Comments by Commissioner McCloskey at the December 1970 Task Force
meeting in Auburn, Massachusetts.
^ Reply by Professor Friedman at the University of Massachusetts,
October 1971.
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power was answered. In rendering the opinion, Justice Jennings replied:
The statutes and private acts give broad powers
to the defendant (board) with reference to educa-
tional matters and school management in Norwalk. If
it chooses to negotiate with the plaintiff (associa-
tion) with regard to the employment, salaries, grie-
vance procedures and working conditions of its mem-
bers, there is no statute, public or private, which
forbids such negotiations. It is a matter of common
knowledge that this is the method pursued in most
school systems large enough to support a teachers’
association in some form. It would seem to make no
difference theoretically whether the negotiations
are with a committee of the whole association or with
individuals or small related groups
,
so long as anv
agreement made with the committee is confined to mem-
bers of the association. If the strike threat is
absent and the defendant prefers to handle the matter
through negotiations with the plaintiff, no reason
exists why it should not do so. The claim of the
defendant that this would be an illegal delegation
of authority is without merit . The authority is and
remains with the board
.
(italics added)
The second question concerns whether the local boards would be com-
mitting an unfair labor practice if they chose to negotiate as a group
with representatives of several teacher organizations, some of which
have not been recognized or designated as the "exclusive" representa-
tive. In other words, is a school board legally obligated to enter in-
to negotiations with a single exclusive representative, or may it enter
into joint board negotiations with several of these exclusive represen-
tatives?
Although Section 178 L (4) provides that public employers are pro-
hibited from "refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an
employee organization which has been recognized or designated as the
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exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit.""* 2 Sec-
tion 178 H (1) provides that employees have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join or assist any employee organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing (italics
added) .” 52
Commissioner McCloskey is in agreement with the investigator’s in-
terpretation that local boards would not be committing an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 178 L (4) by negotiating simul-
taneously with representatives of several recognized teacher associa-
tions. Section 178 H (1) may be interpreted to permit employee units
to join others for purposes of joint negotiations.
It is thus the opinion of the investigator that no legal prohibi-
tions upon the adoption of region-wide collective bargaining exist in
the public schools of Massachusetts.
Contractual Compatibility
Assuming that the parties have the legal capacity to engage in
region-wide collective bargaining, the remainder of this chapter is con-
cerned with determining the degree of similarity between the existing
Section 178 L (4) of Chapter 149 of the General Laws of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts.
Section 178 H (1) of Chapter 149 of the General Laws of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts.
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individual board-association labor agreements. 53 It is assumed that
the greater the degree of similarity between the six labor agreements,
the easier it will be for the parties to negotiate a master labor agree-
ment
.
In an attempt to describe the relative degree of similarity between
the several existing agreements, the investigator has identified several
general areas common to all six contracts, and then further divided
these into sub—areas. Tables have been constructed which compare and
contrast the key provisions within each of these areas. The general
contractual areas around which this analysis has been structured con-
sists of: scope of the agreement; grievance procedure; leave provisions;
professional improvement; salary schedules; and, miscellaneous provi-
sions .
Scope of the Agreement
. In this general category are included those
contractual provisions as they relate to personnel covered by the agree-
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ment
,
expiration dates, and reopening procedures.
Bargaining unit. The term bargaining unit refers to the grouping
of employees for purposes of collective negotiations. Each of the six
The following analysis is based upon the labor agreements between
the five locals of the MTA and the school boards in School Union No.
64. These agreements cover the 1971-72 school year.
While the existence of similar contract language cannot be considered
a prerequisite for the introduction of regional negotiations, it is
assumed that it will considerably facilitate the process given the
existence of the recognized prerequisites.
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agreements specifically identifies certain categories of school personnel
who are covered by the terms of the agreement. Table IX reveals that
substantial differences exist between the agreements with respect to the
categories of personnel covered. While some agreements exclude princi-
pals and vice-principals (Paxton)
,
others (Rutland) specifically include
them. Some agreements (Sterling and Wachusett for example) exclude part-
time personnel from the contract’s coverage; the other agreements are
silent on the status of their part-time personnel.
Some agreements include "professional employees" in their coverage
(Wachusett and Holden); others refer just to "teachers" (Sterling,
Rutland, and Princeton). The question arises as to what specific job
categories fall under the general heading of professional employees and/
or teachers? A teacher is generally considered to be a professional
employee, but what about such occupations as educational and guidance
specialists, directors and supervisors of various fields, athletic
coaches, and school nurses? Likewise, who is a "teacher"? Is it the
individual who holds a teaching certificate and teaches full-time, or
is it the individual who fills a teacher pay slot, but who in reality
functions in a non-teaching role? And, what about the teaching princi-
pal? Would he be included or excluded from the agreement's coverage
in each of these districts?
The above comments should be sufficient to impress upon the reader
that contract coverage is a major problem that must be resolved if the
parties are to establish region-wide collective bargaining.
Expiration dates. Although the agreements do contain different
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expiration dates (June 30, 1972 and 73; August 31, 1972 and 73) this is
not considered to be a particularly troublesome point. The parties can,
by mutual consent, amend the agreements to establish common terms of
coverage.
Reopening procedure. Generally speaking, most labor agreements
contain clauses stating the time and/or circumstances under which con-
tract negotiations can be reopened on specific subjects such as wages.
The usual procedure is to evoke certain procedural steps prior to the
termination date of the existing agreement. This will provide "adequate"
time for the parties to renegotiate a new agreement before the "old"
agreement expires. Most teacher contracts require that notice be given
to the school board of an intent to reopen negotiations early in the
school year. For the agreements under study, the reopening dates range
between September 1 and October 15 of the school year.
Most teacher contracts specify a deadline date for initiating fact-
finding if the parties are deadlocked in their contract negotiations.
As may be observed in Table IX, differences exist among the six con-
tracts’ provisions for initiating fact-finding. Princeton, Rutland,
and Paxton all specify December 1 as the deadline date; Sterling speci-
fies November 1; and, Wachusett Regional specifies October 1. Holden,
on the other hand, does not specify any particular date. All agreements
except Holden's specify the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration
as the tribunal to whom they appeal for fact-finding assistance.
55
The Rutland agreement permits the use of "other appropriate state
agencies" as fact-finding bodies.
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Holden s Agreement does not specify any particular agency.
Grievance Provisions , ilost labor agreements contain a formal plan
which provides for the adjustment of employee complaints over the appli-
cation and/or interpretation of the agreement through discussions at
progressively higher organizational steps, usually culminating in arbi-
tration. This is referred to as the grievance procedure. Usually there
are three elements to the grievance procedure: a definition of what
constitutes a grievance; a statement of the levels and nature of the
terminal step; and, a provision wherein an individual becomes estopped
from using the procedure.
Grievance defined. While each of the agreements under study
generally defines a grievance as some form of complaint involving the
interpretation and/or application of the agreement, Rutland goes beyond
the others by stating that a grievance may also be initiated for alleged
violations of a teacher's "right to fair treatment, or violation of any
established practice. With this exception, each of the agreements
defines grievance in approximately the same way.
Levels and terminal step. A slight difference also exists between
the contracts' provisions as they relate to the number of steps in the
grievance procedure. Generally they provide that the grievance will go
from the principal to the superintendant to the school board to arbitra-
tion. Three of the agreements have inserted a fifth step in their
Contract Between Rutland Teachers' Association and Rutland School
Committee
,
1971, p. 3.
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grievance procedure. Princeton, for example, requires an "informal con-
sultation" between the aggrieved employee and a member of the Profes-
sional Rights and Responsibilities Committee. The other two agreements
(Paxton and Holden) provide variations of the four steps outlined above.
All six agreements provide for binding arbitration as the terminal
step in their grievance disputes . 57 The only difference between the
agreements is in the agency designated as the adjudicator. Three agree-
ments specify that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) shall pro-
vide the arbitrator; two agreements provide that "any mutually acceptable"
person may serve as arbitrator; and, one designates the Massachusetts
State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration (MSBC&A) as the arbitration
tribunal
.
Late-filed grievances. Labor agreements usually require that a
grievant strictly adhere to the established procedural steps, or he will
forfeit his contractual rights to utilize the grievance procedure. This
requirement is typical of grievance procedures found in both public and
private sector labor agreements. With regard to the agreements under
consideration, only one (Rutland) does not specify specific procedural
steps that must be followed if the grievant does not want to lose his
right to process his alleged grievance.
The Rutland agreement limits the arbitrator’s powers by providing
that he shall have no power to modify disciplinary action; and, in
disputes involving "fair treatment", his awards shall be "advisory"
only.
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Table X reveals that, a considerable degree of similarity exists
between the six agreements’ grievance procedures. The areas of difference
appear to be minor. Few, if any, problems should be encountered in com-
bining these grievance procedures into a single, master grievance proce-
dure .
Leave Provisions
. It was at this juncture of the study that the
investigator came to the fullest realization of the magnitude of admi-
nistrative difficulties created by the existence of several different
labor agreements. As is amply illustrated in Table XI, there is very
little (if any) similarity between the six agreements’ leave provisions.
Differences are great with respect to the categories of leaves, and the
length of leave time granted.
Table XI attempts to compare and contrast the various agreements’
provisions as they pertain to sick, personal, sabbatical, emergency,
family, maternity, and "other" leaves. Table XI reveals the following:
first, while in some agreements detailed and concise leave provisions
are provided, in others the provisions can best be described as "fuzzy";
second, while some agreements provide for several different categories
of leaves, others provide few categories of leaves; and finally, because
of the extent of these differences, the investigator expects that these
differences would constitute a major obstacle to be overcome in negoti-
ating a master agreement.
Professional Improvement . Each of the six agreements contains pro-
visions relating to the concept of maintaining or up-dating the faculty
skills. Most of the agreements require individual faculty members to
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obtain a specified number of credit hours within a given time period or
forfeit normal salary increases. Other provisions attempt to assist
the faculty in their efforts to maintain or improve their teaching skills.
This is generally accomplished through provisions for advance departures,
C Q
early dismissals, and tuition reimbursements.
Reference to Table XII reveals that many areas of difference exist
between the six agreements provisions relating to professional improve-
ment. While there are some areas of similarity (in-service course re-
quirements and advance departures)
,
there are other areas in which sub-
stantial differences may be found (tuition reimbursements and workshop
and conference leaves).
It does not appear that these professional improvement provisions
present as great an administrative problem as do those that provide for
other types of leaves; however, the researcher is nevertheless of the
opinion that any attempt to standardize these provisions in a master
agreement would prove to be no simple task.
Miscellaneous Provisions . Under this general rubric the researcher
has included the various contractual provisions as they relate to what
might be categorized as teacher participation, evaluation, and obliga-
tions. Refering to Table XIII the reader will notice that such subjects
C O
For example, as will be illustrated in the following pages, a teacher
with twelve credit hours beyond his bachelor degree would be eligible
to move to the higher (B-H15) schedule after having obtained the re-
quired three extra credit hours.
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as class size, curriculum development, and textbook selection have become
subjects for collective bargaining. Whereas in the past the school
boards have unilaterally established educational policy, today we find
teachers gaining an increasing voice in these matters through the collec-
tive bargaining process. Many agreements have been negotiated that
clearly specify the extent of teacher participation in these areas. This
trend is apparent in the agreements under study.
For the most part these agreements contain provisions that specify
that teachers have the right to "participate," be "notified," or be "con-
sulted" before changes are made in either the curriculum or textbooks.
Only two agreements (Rutland and Wachusett) provide for "recommended"
class sizes. Four of the agreements (Sterling, Rutland, Princeton, and
Wachusett) provide for teacher evaluation procedures. Only two (Holden
and Wachusett) do not make provisions for preference to be given to staff
in filling vacancies. The Paxton agreement is the only one that does
not provide for a duty free lunch period for the instructional staff.
And, for the most part there appears to be considerable variation between
those agreements providing for required teacher meetings and conferences.
The researcher does not anticipate that these miscellaneous provi-
sions would constitute as great an obstacle to negotiating a master ag-
reement as would, for example, leave provisions and/or salary schedules.
Salary Schedules . The data contained in Table XIV present a detailed
breakdown of the salary schedules for each of the six school districts
under consideration. The salary data are arranged on a per-step basis
for each degree requirement category as established in the 1971-1972
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contracts. In addition, to further facilitate the inter—district salary
comparisons. Table XIV contains statistics on the relative distribution
of school personnel on each of the salary plateaus .
^
After having reviewed these salary/personnel schedules individually
and as a group, the investigator offers the following generalizations.
First, the Wachusett Regional agreement not only contains a salary
schedule that pays its teachers a greater salary at each step within the
several degree requirement categories, but also contains the greatest
number of degree requirement categories. Additionally, the relative
distribution of personnel within and between these categories reveals
that a greater percent of the Wachusett teaching personnel are employed
at the higher salary levels.
^
Second, only two of the salary schedules may be considered nearly
identical (Paxton and Rutland) ; the remainder not only differ in terms
of starting salaries and incremental steps, but they also have different
degree requirement categories, and a different number of steps within
each of these categories. Table XIV also reveals that considerable dif-
ferences exist in the percentages of school personnel occupying each of
these categories.
Source of information: Office of the Superintendent of Schools,
School Union No. 64, Holden, Massachusetts.
This can be explained in part by the fact that Wachusett is a re-
gional nigh-school, and this thus may retlect a higher degree re-
quirement and greater teacher specialization than would be necessary
in the other K-8 schools.
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Third, to further complicate attempts at comparison, statistical
data are not available that distinguish between the number of instruc-
tional and non-instructional personnel within each of these categories.
It is not known, for example, how many personnel occupy a teacher "block"
on the salary schedule, but in reality function not as teachers but as
administrators (full or part-time), librarians, or special staff assis-
tants. Comparisons are made more meaningless by the inclusion in these
salary schedules of personnel outside of the bargaining units.
Fourth, there is also no way to assess whether these salary sche-
dules reflect differences in relative board-teacher bargaining power,
or whether they mirror the boards' personnel policies. For example,
high starting salaries might be granted as a deliberate attempt on the
part of the board to attract competent teachers to the schools, or high
salaries may reflect an increase in the teachers' relative bargaining
power
.
Fifth and last, there is no way, based upon the existing salary
schedules, to accurately predict what a master salary schedule might
entail. The "cost" of the master salary schedule would be a function
of the parties' relative bargaining power, and is thus indeterminate.
However, it is safe to predict that the teacher associations would seek
to base the master schedule upon the better paying Wachusett agreement,
and the boards would seek to base it upon those agreements that pay the
teachers less. The eventual agreement would, as has been stated, be a
function of the respective parties bargaining power. And, to the extent
that regional negotiations alter the relative bargaining power, this
will be reflected in the terms of the master agreement.
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TABLE XV
PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION
(By Percent)*
B B+15 M M+15 M+30 CAC-S DR
HOLDEN 51% 25% 21% -% 3% 1% -%
PAXTON 41 23 23 5 8 - -
PRINCETON 64 18 14 - 5 - -
RUTLAND 58 24 7 7 3 - -
STERLING 64 13 17 7 - - -
WACHUSETT
REGIONAL
16 26 36 9 11 1 1
* Rounded to nearest percentage
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Summary
. To recapitulate, the investigator offers these conclusions:
1. It is the investigator’s conclusion that no legal barrier exists
to the introduction and maintenance of region-wide collective
bargaining in School Union No. 64. Because the local boards
retain the power to ratify, and thereby accept or reject, the
terms of the master agreement, they would not be illegally dele-
gating their discretionary powers by entering into regional
negotiations. It would not be an unfair labor practice for
the local boards to bargain as a group with a common represen-
tative of several teacher exclusive bargaining representatives.
2. A review of the existing agreements' provisions has disclosed
that in some areas the agreements are very similar; however,
in others they offer little resemblance to one another. The
areas of similarity are found in those provisions relating to
the subjects of grievances, teacher rights, and teacher obli-
gations. Significant differences may be observed in the vari-
ous agreements' provisions for leaves. However, despite these
differences, the investigator believes that the evidence has
demonstrated that sufficient areas of commonality exist which
may provide the basis for the negotiation of a region-wide mas-
ter labor agreement.
CHAPTER IV
REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE
back to tbs design of this study, there remains to bs
explored only one "precondition" to the establishment of multi-employer
bargaining in the public sector of the economy. This precondition con-
cerns the parties' willingness to become involved in region-wide col-
lective bargaining. The purpose of this chapter is to determine their
relative willingness because it is assumed that if the parties are not
willing to participate in regional negotiations, then such a proposal
cannot be considered feasible.
The conclusions of the previous chapters have been based upon an
analysis of objective legal, contractual, and financial data. The con-
clusion of this chapter rests upon the investigator's evaluation of
generally non-quantifiable
,
subjective data. Although this factor builds
into the study a potential source of error, the investigator has attempted
to compensate for this by obtaining information from many sources and in
many different ways. The investigator has relied upon the use of ques-
tionnaires, personal interviews, and public documents to obtain attitu-
dinal data from regional and local board members, the Superintendent of
the Union and Regional schools and his administrative staff, state and
local association officials, and "other" interested persons. The results
of this survey appear in the following pages.
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Personal Interviews
The investigator was afforded the opportunity of attending a Task
Force meeting at Auburn, Massachusetts, on December 3, 1970. 61 This
meeting, which was chaired by Mr. John Collins, Regional Director of
the Worcester Office of the State Department of Education, was called
for the purpose of explaining the proposed Pilot Project to state and
local Massachusetts Teacher Association representatives. Present at
the meeting were the Task Force members, representatives of the State
Department of Education, the Massachusetts School Board Association
representative and state, regional and local MIA officials.
During the course of the evening, the investigator discussed the
proposed pilot project with the assembled officials. The pertinent re-
sults of these discussions have been summarized and are offered below.
Task Force Representatives
. At the onset of the Auburn meeting it
became apparent that a few members of the Task Force had strong doubts
whether voluntary nulti-board collective bargaining was feasible, not
only in the area under study, but in public education in general. The
majority of the Task Force, however, was of the opinion that regional
negotiations could work if the parties were willing to give it a try.
A major discussion evolved around whether or not the communities in
School Union No. 64 were similar enough to permit regional negotiations.
fi 1
The researcher attended this meeting both at the invitation of the
State Department of Education and as a representative for Professor
Friedman, Task Force member.
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Many expressed the concern that the towns were not financially compatible
enough to become involved in the proposed joint venture. The Task Force
members were in general agreement that regional negotiations (or some
other form of multi-employer bargaining) was a desirable alternative to
the existing local board - local association relationships.
Teacher Association Representatives
. The reaction of the state
and local association representatives to the concept of region-wide ne-
gotiations was, at best, guarded. While their public response was that
they were willing to give it serious consideration, privately their atti-
tude can be summed as: "why should we? What is in it for us?"
Tbs investigator talked informally with the state and local associ-
ation officials both before and after the meeting. During these informal
conversations these officials expressed a strong negative attitude toward
the proposal. Two of the local officials voiced the opinion that they
did not want to get involved with a couple of the other local associa-
tions, "because," as one of the local presidents replied, "we spend a
lot of time researching our positions, and because we come prepared, we
get the best contracts. These other guys in
,
don't want to do
anything. I don't like freeloaders." It was explained that the asso-
ciations in two of the communities were very weak in leadership and mem-
ber participation, and that if they were to go into partnership with
these locals they would only hurt themselves.
Another association member stated that the working conditions with-
in the regional high-school and the local schools were too different to
permit their standardization in a region-wide master labor agreement.
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While, as has been stated, some association members saw regional
negotiations as limiting their relative bargaining power, others saw it
as a means through which to enhance theirs. When pushed on this point,
they conceded that regional bargaining would probably result in an
"averaging" of the terms of the existing agreements, and, while some
associations would benefit, others would suffer.
The state officials brought up the point that region—wide bargain-
ing would also deprive the locals of one of their most effective bar-
gaining weapons — the ability to play one local board against another.
This, it was pointed out, would only increase the local boards' bar-
gaining powers at the expense of the local associations.
One local president suggested that the discussion was all academic
because the local boards would never go along with the project. As he
expressed it, "not only are there some real differences between the
school boards, but one board differs with everyone and everything just
for the hell of it." Ke mentioned personality conflicts within and be-
tween the boards as a major barrier to joint board participation in
region-wide collective bargaining.
School Board Members . As has previously been stated, at this meeting
the investigator volunteered to analyze the several labor agreements to
see if areas of commonality could be identified upon which a master agree-
ment might be negotiated. This analysis was completed in the fall of
1971. It was at this time that Dr. Edward Yaglou, Superintendent of
Schools for Union No. 64 and the Wachusett Regional School District,
contacted the investigator and requested that he present his findings at
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a joint regional-union board meeting on October 7, 1971. 62
The subsequent meeting was held in the Superintendent’s Office at
the Wachusett Regional High School in Holden, Massachusetts. In atten-
dance at this meeting were Mr. Collins, Regional Director, Superinten-
dent Yaglou, and members of the joint regional-union school boards.
After the investigator broadly outlined his preliminary findings, the
discussion shifted to include the whole concept of regional negotiations.
It was at this point that the investigator distributed copies of
Norrgard’s "Minnesota Experience" to those present. Several questions
were then raised by the board members. These included: whether the
local boards could legally participate in regional negotiations; what
would be the benefits to the teachers and the boards from such a program;
and, what steps would the investigator recommend for initiating a move-
ment toward regional negotiations.
They were advised that the investigator had previously discussed
the question of legality with experts in the field (see Chapter III) , and
it was his opinion that there was nothing in the statutes that would
prohibit their engaging in regional negotiations.
62
Mr. Collins indicated that he had informed Dr. Yaglou that an analysis
was being made of the labor agreements.
63
Copies of Tables IX - XIII were distributed at this meeting to further
support the researcher's contention that there were several clearly
identifiable areas of similarity (see Chapter III) between the six
agreements
.
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In response to the question concerning the expected benefits from
regional negotiations, the investigator responded that both parties could
expect to benefit through having to devote less time and effort to pre-
paring for negotiations, by having available a more professional and
thorough approach to negotiations, and by having a more easily adminis-
trable master agreement. It was also suggested that the boards would
benefit inasmuch as they would not be exposed to "local" coercive com-
parisons. The teacher associations, it was suggested, would benefit
by having a greater security from rival organizations, and by being bet-
ter able to utilize the services of the state association's professional
staff. This latter comment appeared to worry some of the board mem-
,
64
bers, because they did not want "outsiders" interfering with their
teacher relationships.
One possible approach to introducing regional negotiations was
offered by the researcher. This would involve; first, establishing in-
dividual board contacts with each of the local associations to determine
if they wished to participate; second, assuming that they (and the local
boards) were interested, forming a joint board-teacher association sub-
committee to establish the "mechanics 1, for negotiating the first agree-
ment; and, finally limiting the first agreement to those subjects for
which there already exists a high degree of similarity in the existing
agreements. The more complex issues could be resolved on a local board-
Another area of concern was provoked by the researcher's comment that
the boards could expect that the associations would seek to negotiate
into the master agreement the best (to them) provisions in each of
the current agreements.
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teacher association basis. Gradually, as the relationship matured, the
parties might move to include these more complex issues as subjects for
regional negotiations.
The sub
-commit tee indicated their further interest by voting to
recommend to their respective boards that the respective local associa-
tion officials be approached regarding their possible interest in re-
gional negotiations. One member suggested that perhaps it would be best
to approach them after the current negotiations were completed, other-
wise, it might "influence" the outcome of the negotiations. The other
board members seemed to agree. A motion was then made and passed to
give the investigator the fullest cooperation in his project. The sub-
committee then invited the investigator to present his findings at their
spring meeting.
Administrative Representatives
. Three key administrators in the
region under study were interviewed to determine their attitudes toward
the possible introduction of regional negotiations in School Union No.
6A. These administrators were: Dr. Edward P. Yaglou, Regional and Union
Superintendent of Schools; Mr. Edward O’Connor, Associate Regional and
Union Superintendent; and, Mr. William F. Carey, Assistant Superintendent
of Schools for Union No. 64. As all three of these administrators are
directly concerned with the negotiation and administration of the labor
agreements, each was interviewed personally .
^
Administratively Dr. Yaglou has the over-all responsibility for ad-
ministering the school systems. In fulfilling these administrative
responsibilities, he has delegated the responsibility for contract
negotiations in the Wachusett Regional High School to Mr. O'Connor.
Mr. Carey has the responsibility for negotiating with the remaining
five districts.
91
During the subsequent interviews each administrator was asked (1)
what he perceived to be the major advantages and/or disadvantages of
regional negotiations, and (2) whether he thought such a proposal was
feasible given the economic, social and political structure of the com-
munities
.
Despite some initial hedging, there seemed to be some agreement
that regional negotiations offer both potential disadvantages as well
as advantages. It was suggested that one possible disadvantage could
result from the standardization of the duties and payments to certain
classes of personnel. It was felt that if the master agreement stan-
dardized duties and salaries in the several school systems, problems
could arise in the case of those individuals who are currently filling
certain positions on a semi-formal, non-paid basis. It was believed
that these persons would demand the same benefits as those individuals
in the larger systems who functioned in these roles on a full-time, paid
basis. It was also feared that personnel in the smaller systems would
demand the creation of those job categories found only in the larger
school systems.
The principle advantages of regional negotiations were seen to be
found in the areas of contract negotiation and administration. One ad-
ministrator replied that as things stood now, contract preparation and
negotiations had evolved into a year-round job, and that he expected it
would get much worse as cne other non-instructional categories of em-
ployees demanded "this and that" just to keep up with the instructional
staff. With the issues becoming more complex, the teachers demanding
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more and more, and other employees wanting to "hop on the wagon," the job
of negotiating and administering the labor agreements was becoming "one
big headache. When he was asked if many problems were encountered in
administering several agreements, one of the administrators replied,
"that is the understatement of the year."
Responding to the question, "are regional negotiations feasible in
your area? they seemed quite pessimistic. This pessimism was predicated
on the belief that the communities were generally non-compatible. It
was pointed out that Holden is a large (relatively) industrial community
that has many of the problems normally associated with larger communities.
The other communities, on the other hand, are relatively small and have
not experienced these problems. And, where Holden is an "urban," indus-
trial community
,
the others are rural communities which serve as "bed-
rooms" for the Worcester and Fitchburg metropolitan areas.
Although there was an apparent reluctance to comment upon the sub-
ject, one administrator indicated that historical inter-community rival-
ry had created "wounds" that time had not healed. It was expected that
these community rivalries would either inhibit or preclude the establish-
ment of regional negotiations. When the researcher inquired as to what
the five communities had in common, one administrator summed up his
thoughts with two words: "geographic proximity."
Voting Records . Many of the respondents have cited the fact that
the five communities had overwhelmingly turned down a proposal to regio-
nalize their K-8 schools as an index of voter sentiment toward any kind
of joint community venture. As provisions for establishing multi-board
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bargaining was specifically included in the regionalization proposal, the
investigator believes it worth calling to the attention of the reader.
The investigator does not claim that the following represents the voter
attitudes toward regional negotiations, it is being offered only to pro-
vide another vantage point from which to assess community willingness
to participate in local joint ventures.
In November of 1971 the so-called "K-12 Plan” was submitted to the
voters of the five communities for approval. This plan had been the
result of two years' work by the Wachusett Regional School Committee
and the School Union No. 64 Planning Board. The initial study was
prompted by the State Department of Education guidelines seeking the
realignment of public school systems into unified districts of 2,000
or more pupils on a K-12 basis. The proposed regional district was to
be under the jurisdiction of a single regional school committee. This
proposed new nine member regional school committee would replace the
existing 14 member Wachusett Regional Committee and the 19 members of
the five local boards and union board. In place of these local school
committees the K-12 Plan called for the appointment of a "citizens ad-
visory board" of three to five members. This board was to provide a
channel of communication to the proposed new regional board. Provisions
were also included for an "escape hatch" procedure for towns that de-
cided that they wished to withdraw from the regional system.
Of particular interest to this study is Section 18 of the "Revised
Agreement," entitled Collective Bargaining Contracts . This section
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contains the following provisions
All employees of the local school committees
of the member towns who are covered by the provisions
of a collective bargaining contract on December 31,
1971, shall become members of the appropriate Wachu-
sett District bargaining group and be covered by the
Wachusett contract and no salary shall be reduced and
no benefit shall be reduced or delegated because of
the transfer to the Wachusett District group.
While, as it has been stated, it is difficult to generalize whether
the actions of the voters reflected their attitude toward regionaliza-
tion per se, or to specific parts of the total proposal such as the dis-
bandment of the local school boards, the creation of citizen advisory
boards, or the establishment of regional negotiations, the results do
reveal that the voters were unhappy about something.
At special town meetings held on November 1, 1971, only the voters
of one town (Paxton) favored the plan (96-34) . The remaining communities
overwhelmingly rejected the K-12 Plan. The Worcester Telegram reported
that in Holden, the Town Moderator, "declared the vote unanimously opposed
to the K-12 Plan after a voice vote in which an overwhelming majority of
6 7
voters shouted their opposition." It was further reported that in
Rutland the count was 97 to 7; Princeton recorded 116 to 38; and, in
f) QSterling "a show of hands recorded 280 opposed and 3 in favor."
Revised Agreement for a Regional School District: for the Towns of
Holden, Paxton, Princeton, Rutland and Sterling
,
Section 18, "Collec-
tive Bargaining Contracts," September 27, 1971, p. 21.
Worcester Telegram
,
November 2, 1971, p. 1.
68
Ibid.
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A post-mortem by the Telegram offered these reasons for the defeat
ot the plan: a fear of loss of local control of the public schools; the
belief that "it's too big a responsibility to put schools in the hands
of one central board;” and a widespread inability to see how the plan
would benefit certain communities. 69 The Worcester Sunday Telegram
quoted four of the five-member Holden board as expressing their belief
that "the plan has few educational advantages for Holden, and Holden tax-
payers would ultimately pay more for education under the plan." 70 Two
Sterling residents who served on the School Union No. 64 Planning Board
that designed the K-12 Plan later expressed public opposition to it on
the grounds that "Sterling would be giving up its veto power and its
three members on the Wachusett Regional Committee, and would have no
voice about where a new school building could be built." 71
When questioned why he thought the voters had so overwhelmingly
defeated the plan, Superintendent Yaglou replied that they could not see
how it would benefit their individual communities. And, with the pos-
sible exception of assisting the financing of a badly needed new middle
69
Worcester Telegram
,
November 2, 1971, p. 12.
Worcester Sunday Telegram
,
October 31, 1971, p. 36.
71
Ibid.
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school, and simplifying his board relationships, 72 he personally would
be hard pressed to cite additional advantages under the plan.
According to Superintendent Yaglou, the MTA locals appeared to ex-
press coolness to the plan, but he could not say for sure that this cool-
ness was directed at Section 18 (the collective bargaining provision).
Publicly the MTA took no formal position.
Paxton residents who were questioned why Paxton voted (96-34) to
accept the plan, replied that it was cheaper to build schools under a
regional system, and, besides, the plan provided for a middle school to
be built in the Paxton-Sterling area.
Questionnaires
A further attempt was made to determine the attitudes of each of
the "key actors" toward regional negotiations through the use of a
questionnaire. As designed, this questionnaire contained two parts.
One part consisted of a semantic differential modeled after the instru-
ment developed by the team of Osgood, Susi, and Tannenbaum. The second
part consisted of two open-ended questions. These questions asked: how
the respondent personally felt about region-wide collective bargaining;
and, how he perceived his constituents would feel about the possibility
The buildings proposed in the plan would receive 61.4% in state, aid,
compared to the 41% for new schools built in a non-regior.alized school
system. Superintendent Yaglou stated that dealing with one regional
school committee would be less cumbersome than the present structure
whereby he must deal with five local, one union, and one regional board.
73
Osgood, loc . cit .
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of local boards and teacher association joining for regional negotiations.
The semantic differential was comprised of eight key statements re-
lating to the concept of regional negotiations; below each statement were
a set of fourteen "evaluative" factors selected from those having a
loading of .75 or higher in the Osgood Table of Rotated Factors Loading
Analysis. The respondents were instructed to indicate their reaction to
these statements by placing an "X" at the appropriate position on each
of the fourteen scales (see index for sample questionnaire)
. The reli-
ability of the instrument was to be determined by the use of the Spearman-
Brown Prophecy Formula whereby the fourteen scales under each of the
eight statements would be divided into "half-tests," and a correlation
computed between the half-tests.^
The population to whom the questionnaires were administered con-
sisted of 28 school board members in each of the local, union, and re-
gional school boards in the area, and to the six presidents of the local
teacher associations. Accompanying these questionnaires was an introduc-
tory letter explaining the purpose of the questionnaire ( a sample intro-
ductory letter may be found in the index)
. These questionnaires were
Harold Walker and J. Levy, Elementary Statistical Methods (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1958). It was recognized that the correla-
tion between half-tests is lower than may have been obtained under
alternative tests; however, it was assumed that the naif-test would
have provided a "reasonable approximation" of the reliability of the
instrument in determining the actors' attitude regional negotiations.
The formula to be utilized was:
(R = correlation between 2 comparable test forms; and r = the correla-
tion between the 2 half-tests.)
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mailed to all school board members on December 7, 1971. With minor
changes the same questionnaire was mailed to all local association pre-
sidents on December 29, 1971. 75 m each case a follow-up letter (see
Index) was mailed within a few days requesting that the questionnaire be
returned as soon as possible. Within a week a post-card (see index) was
sent reminding those who had not returned their questionnaires to please
do so
.
The following table summarizes the board responses to the question-
naires :
BOARD SENT RETURNED
Wachusett Regional 9* o
Holden 5 4
Paxton 3 0
Princeton 3 2
Rutland 3 2**
Sterling 5 2
Total 28 13
* The Wachusett Regional Board is a 14 member board;
however, as six of these members also sat on local
beards they received only one questionnaire. Three
of the six local members on the Wachusett Regional
Board responded.
** One respondent replied by letter that he was responding
"on behalf of the Rutland School Board."
The "minor changes" consisted of changing the word "board" to read
"association.
"
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School Board Response
. About forty-seven percent of the school
board members returned the questionnaire. As Is Indicated above, the
responses varied between Holden's eighty percent and Paxton's "non-
response. Only one responding board member completely filled out the
semantic differential portion of the questionnaire, and his comment at
the end of this portion was, "this is ridiculous!” Some of the other-
respondents attempted to fill out the semantic differential; however,
after the first page or two, they proceeded to either cross out the en-
tire page and/or only respond to certain factors on the fourteen point
scale. Several respondents added remarks like, "this is for 4 year-
olds, "Silly," or "stupid set of answers" on the pages. Nearly all of
the respondents responded directly to the statements at the top of the
semantic differential. This, of course, precluded the utilization of
the semantic differential as a method for "scientifically" determining
the relative attitudes of the key actors toward the concept of regional
negotiations in School Union No. 64.
The investigator does believe that the responses to the question-
naires open-ended questions, as well as the comments directed at the
key statements, provided a valuable clue to their attitudes toward region-
wide collective bargaining. To facilitate presentation, the school beard
members’ responses have been capsulated into the following statements.
Generally, it was believed that:
1. Regional negotiations may be desirable inasmuch as they were
seen as a method for eliminating "whip-sawing" (some called it
"seesawing")
,
and thereby allowing board members more time to
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2
.
3.
4.
spend on "other school business;
Regional negotiations may be expected to/ cost some towns more
money as the teachers would seek to bring all their agreements
up to the level of the Wachusett Regional agreement;
Regional negotiations may be expected to result In some loss
of control of the schools;
Regional negotiations may be good In theory; however, it is not
feasible in Union No. 64 because the towns differ in financial
ability
;
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5. Regional negotiations would not be supported by the taxpaying
public because the public would believe it would result in
higher teacher salaries and therefore higher property taxes;
6. Regional negotiations were viewed as offering these potential
_
a
.
d
.Yanta Pes : eliminating whipsawing, freeing board members from
bargaining subcommittees, simplifying the attraction and reten-
tion of teachers, permitting more expertise to be utilized at
the bargaining table, improving inter-board communications, and
preventing the MTA from establishing a big wage "pattern;" 75 and,
One member responded that he did not believe regional negotiations
to be feasible because the boards "had trouble even agreeing on a com-
mon school calendar, so how could you expect them to agree on this!"
It Is of perhaps significance to note that not one board member sug-
gested that regional negotiations would make the Superintendent's job
easier. In an earlier interview, one member of the administrative
staff commented that the boards were not concerned with making their
joo easier because, in his words, "they pay us for our headaches."
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7. Regional negotiations were viewed as offering these potential
disadvantages: stifling local educational innovations; re-
sulting in a further separation between teachers, administrators,
board members, and voters; eliminating the possibility of local
wage-benefit trade-offs; imposing added costs on poorer commu-
nities; creating agencies further removed from voter control;
depersonalizing the board-teacher relationships; introducing
professional union negotiators to local negotiations; increasing
the power of unions; and, spreading divisiveness throughout the
region.
Teacher Association Response
. Of the six questionnaires mailed to
the local teacher association presidents four, or about sixty—six percent,
were returned. Only the Paxton and Wachusett Regional associations did
not respond. The responses to the questions have been condensed and are
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summarized below:
1. The Sterling Teacher Association replied that "Region-wide col-
lective bargaining would be detrimental to towns already having
'good’ contracts. Sterling and Princeton, having better salary
schedules, would be at a disadvantage with Paxton and Rutland
and Holden, which are much less."
2. The Princeton Teacher Association replied that "this (regional
negotiations) would not be feasible in our association."
76
Two of the respondents were recently elected to the office of presi-
dent in their respective locals. Their comments mirror those of
their predecessors.
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3. The Holden Teacher Association responded that "In the past when
we were the highest we rejected attempts to unify the towns for
one contract... It would (now) be to our advantage as we are
the lowest paid of the towns... (T)he MTA likes to play one
town against the other and are afraid of losing leverage."
4. The Rutland Teacher Association stated that "Some of the
teachers attitudes seem rather provincial - they are afraid
of the town (Rutland) losing local control; of Holden getting
more than its share of the benefits; of having to pay more
taxes (most teachers live and work in Rutland)... and because
this provincialism, those who oppose, I believe, outnumber
those who favor."
5. Regional negotiations were seen to offer the following advan—
tages to the teacher association(s) : equalize salaries between
elementary and high school teachers; permit personnel transfers
between different districts; allow a pooling of local associa-
tion talents; and, increasing some local association’s bargain-
,
77ing powers.
6. Regional negotiations were believed to present certain disad-
vantages to the local teacher association(s) . This includes:
the loss of local autonomy; a dilution of some local’s
It is interesting to note that none of the responses suggested as a
possible advantage consider a better utilization of professional staff
assistance, or an elimination of the wastes in time and effort in-
herent in the existing bargaining relationships. It will be recalled
that these are considered to be two of the principle advantages to
accrue to the association under regional negotiations!
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bargaining power; an "averaging" of contract provisions; and, a
loss of the ability to whip-saw local boards.
7. Responses to the question on whether the voters would support
regional negotiations were generally negative. They ranged from
an outright "No" to a "Huh!". In response to the question on
the feasibility of regional negotiations, these remarks were
made: "not feasible in our association;" "possible - yes, but
doubtful; and, 'now would be a good time to try to bring us
together.
"
Summa ry . The central focus of this chapter has been on assessing
the relative willingness of the key actors to become involved in region-
wide collective bargaining in School Union No. 64. The attitudinal data
have been assembled from several sources through the use of personal in-
terviews, questionnaires and public records. Despite the limitations
inherent in the methodology utilized, the investigator believes that the
assembled evidence supports these generalizations
:
1. Board members questioned both the desirability and the feasibi-
lity of regional negotiations on the grounds that the five com-
munities are not financially compatible, and as regional nego-
tiations could cost some communities more money, the voters
would never support their boards' movements in this direction -
assuming that the boards wanted to in the first place. While
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some advantages were offered in the areas of contract negotia-
tion (time saving) and administration (easier to administer)
,
the boards believed that these advantages were offset by the
probability of more costly labor agreements - and higher taxes.
In addition the boards were fearful that they would "lose con-
trol of their local schools."
2- The school administrators perceived a net gain to be derived
from regional negotiations. However, they were doubtful that
the local boards would want to become involved in regional ne-
gotiations
.
3. The voting public was viewed by both the boards and the associ-
ations as being very much opposed to any plan that might con-
ceivably increase their taxes and/or deprive them of control
of their schools.
A. The association officials at both the state and local levels
perceived regional negotiations as placing local associations
at a relative bargaining disadvantage vis-a-vis the local
boards. It was generally presumed that regional negotiations
would strip the locals of their most powerful bargaining
weapon - the ability to whipsaw the local boards. None of the
respondents were able (or attempted) to identify the major be-
nefits to be obtained from regional negotiations: the elimina-
tion of the existing duplications in bargaining time and effort,
and a more effective utilization of MTA professional staff ne-
gotiation and administration services.
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To briefly summarize
,
the evidence assembled clearly revealed that
the key "actors" had strong reservations about joining for purposes of
regional negotiations. Although each party did identify several advan-
tages it would obtain from negotiating on a region-wide basis, they also
cited several important (to them) reasons for not joining a region-wide
bargaining relationship.
CHAPTER V
FEASIBILITY OF REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SCHOOL UNION NO. 64
Conclusion
To briefly recapitulate, this study has had a dual objective: (1)
to familiarize the reader with problems associated with local board-
teacher association bargaining relationships, and to describe the efforts
of the Massachusetts Department of Education to alleviate these problems
through the introduction of region-wide collective bargaining; and, (2)
based upon the established preconditions for successful multi-employer
bargaining in the public sector, to assess the feasibility of regional
negotiations in School Union No. 64.
With regard to the first objective, the preponderance of evidence
indicates that local board—teacher association bargaining relationships
do entail many inefficiencies that can be remedied through the adoption
of a multi-employer bargaining structure. Potentially, regional nego-
tiations will eliminate the duplication found in preparing for and nego-
tiating several labor agreements and it will result in a master agree-
ment that is easier for the administration to administer. And, it may
also be argued, that as both parties will be able to utilize profes-
sional negotiators in their contract negotiations, this will result in
fewer disputes both during and after negotiations.
Regional negotiations also offer individual advantages to the local
boards and teacher associations. The local boards would collectively
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benefit through the acquisition of an immunity from the association prac-
tices of playing one local board against another. The local associations
collectively stand to benefit through a more efficient utilization of
MTA staff personnel, and to gain a greater degree of security from po-
tential rival organizations.
Recognizing the many benefits to be obtained from introducing re-
gional negotiations, the Massachusetts Department of Education directed
its Task Force on Collective Bargaining to establish a Pilot Program in
the five towns comprising School Union No. 64. Despite numerous meetings
with board and teacher representatives at the state and local levels,
little identifiable progress has been made toward establishing regional
negotiations
.
Utilizing the "preconditions" for successful multi-employer bargain-
ing in the public sector, the investigator has attempted to determine
whether voluntary region-wide collective bargaining is feasible in School
Union No. 64. The evidence suggests that, on the surface, School Union
No. 64 is an "ideal" place to introduce a pilot program of regional ne-
gotiations. Not only were most of Professor Smythe’s preconditions
clearly present, but the parties also had the moral support and encourage-
ment of the Task Force. Only three of the preconditions could not be
readily answered with an unqualified "yes." These were restated as ques-
tions and expressed as: (1) are the towns similar in their financial
ability to support their public schools; (2) do the local school boards
have the contractual capacity to join in regional negotiations; and (3)
do the "key actors" want to become involved in region-wide collective
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bargaining. The relative importance of these three questions is such
that a "no" answer to any of them would have an adverse effect upon the
feasibility of introducing regional negotiations.
The question of relative fiscal ability was examined in Chapter
II. This was explored by separating fiscal ability into two related
components: community fiscal capacity, and community fiscal effort.
When examining only community fiscal capacity, the question was raised
whether Princeton was compatible with the other communities; however,
an analysis of community fiscal effort clearly demonstrated that Prince-
ton could make a financial effort equal to that of the other communi-
ties. Thus, although lacking in fiscal capacity, Princeton appeared
to have sufficient community fiscal willingness to utilize its limited
resources to permit it to participate in regional collective bargaining.
In Chapter III an inquiry was made into the local boards’ contrac-
tual capacity. This inquiry revealed that as long as no statutory pro-
hibitions on such activity exist, it is within the broad discretionary
powers of the local school boards to enter into region-wide collective
bargaining. Likewise, evidence also indicates that joint board negoti-
ations with several certified teacher associations could not be consti-
tuted as an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the teacher bar-
gaining statute.
The remaining question concerned the willingness of the parties
to become involved in regional negotiations. Unlike the previous ques-
tions, whose answers could be determined from an analysis of quantifi-
able, objective data, the investigator has had to rely upon his
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interpretation of non-quantifiable
,
subjective information obtained from
selected school board, association and administrative officials. The
only scientific" approach toward determining attitudes had to be dis-
carded because of the unwillingness of the respondents to cooperate with
the investigator. Nevertheless, the investigator believes that suffi-
cient data have been obtained from sufficient sources to justify the
following conclusion.
The preponderance of the evidence suggests that, despite their ini-
interest in regional negotiations, the parties are not now willing
to become involved in region-wide collective bargaining.
Both the local school boards and the local teacher associations
are reluctant to participate in this proposed joint venture. This re-
luctance can be traced to a jointly shared belief that regional negoti-
ations will benefit the other party more than it will them. More spe-
cifically, while the board members can identify some benefits to be ob-
tained from regional negotiations, they have strong fears that it will
also result in a diminution of their control over the local schools,
and ultimately to the imposition of an added financial burden upon their
community. As political entities, they are obviously sensitive to any
proposal that might necessitate increasing local taxes, and thus incur-
ring the ire of the voters. The voters, by their voting record on the
K-12 Plan, clearly indicate their sentiment toward plans that might re-
sult in loss of control of the local schools and/or increase their taxes.
None of the local association presidents identified two of the ma-
jor advantages of regional negotiations (savings in time and effort and
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a better utilization o£ professional staff). Nearly all expressed con-
cern that regional negotiations would weaken their bargaining power by
depriving them of their most effective bargaining technique - whipsawing.
This concern was shared by both state and local officials.
Only those association officials who currently had a relatively
"poorer" contract indicated that they might be interested in joining
other associations for regional negotiations. Those associations who
currently have the "better" agreements asserted that they did not want
to join with the other associations because they could get a better con-
tract on their own. The prevailing association attitude is summed up
in a questionnaire response from the President of the Holden Teachers
Association
:
Our teachers now would probably join with the
other towns for one contract. It would be to our ad-
vantage as we are the lowest paid of the towns.
In the past when we were the highest we rejected
attempts to unify the towns. This is one of the real
problems to overcome. The other is the fact that the
M.T.A. likes to play one town against the other and
are afraid of losing leverage.
While it is much less obvious, the researcher has detected another
possible reason why the association officials are reluctant to partici-
pate in regional negotiations. This is a desire to retain their per-
sonal influence over their membership. An association official can con-
tinue to be recognized as influential only as long as he personally can
exert influence in the negotiations that will determine the employment
conditions of his constituency. The extent to which the official per-
ceives that regional negotiations will limit his role in the bargaining
Ill
process, will adversely influence his willingness to participate.
It is thus the researcher’s conclusion that the voluntary introduc-
tion of region-wide collective bargaining in Massachusetts School Union
No. 64 is not feasible at this time. This conclusion is predicated on
evidence that both parties harbor a strong belief that it would be to
their disadvantage to become involved in regional negotiations. Each
perceives his involvement in such a proposal as improving the other
side's bargaining power vis-a-vis his own. Therefore, unless and until
both parties become convinced that it would be to their relative advan-
tage to participate in regional negotiations, such a proposal cannot
be considered feasible.
appendix a
QUESTIONNAIRE TO BOARD AND ASSOCIATION OFFICIALS
<£\
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ATIONS AMD RESEARCH CENTER
Draper Hall Area Code 413
545-2893. 545-2884. or 545-2860December 7, 1971
Dear Sir:
You are undoubtedly aware that the Massachusetts Board of Education
Task Force on Collective Bargaining in public education has been
exploring the feasibility of establishing "region-wide" collective
bargaining in this state, and that School Union No. 64 has been
selected as the focal point of this study.
Region—wide collective bargaining is seen as an alternative to the
existing local school board - local teacher association bargaining
relationship. Region-wide collective bargaining would consist of
a^L_l local scaool boards and all local teacher associations joining
together for purposes of negotiating a single, "master" labor agree-
ment. This master agreement would, more or less, standardize employ-
ment conditions within the regional school district.
In my capacity as a doctoral candidate at the University, I have
volunteered my assistance in determining the feasibility of intro-
ducing region-wide bargaining in School Union No. 64. It is in this
respect that I am requesting your assistance. As I have been unable
personally to contact each local board member, I have constructed a
questionnaire which is designed to reflect your attitude towards in-
troducing region-wide bargaining in your School Union. Although the
enclosed questionnaire appears to be rather lengthy, it should take
no more than ten minutes of your time. In addition to the form ques-
tionnaire, I would also appreciate a brief statement concerning (1)
what you believe to be the advantages and/or disadvantages of such a
proposal; and (2) whether the voters would accept such a proposal.
After you have finished the questionnaire, please place it in the
enclosed, stamped envelope and mail it at your earliest convenience.
All replies will, of course, be held in the strictest confidence.
Results of this study shall be made available to the Task Force and
interested local parties.
Thank you and best wishes for the new year,
Wayne L. Emerson
WLE : sod
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SAMPLE*
INSTRUCTIONS
At the top of each of the following pages appears a short statement
related to the concept of region-wide collective bargaining in the pub-
lic schools. Each statement is followed by a set of fourteen scales.
Please evaluate each statement in terms of each set of scales.
HERE IS HOW TO USE THE SET OF SCALES:
1. If you feel that the statement is VERY CLOSELY related to one (or
the other) end of the scale, you should place an "X" as follows:
STRONG X WEAK
STRONG X WEAK
2. Should you feel that the statement is MODERATELY related to one (or
the other) end of the scale, you should place an "X" as follows:
G00D X BAD
GOOD X BAD
3. Or, if you feel NEUTRAL toward the statement, you should place an
"X" as follows:
FAIR X UNFAIR
PLEASE USE THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE to make a brief
comment on (1) what you believe to be the advantages and/or disadvan-
tages of region-wide collective bargaining in your school district;
and (2) whether or not you believe that your constituents would favor
such a proposal.
Thank you for your cooperation.
* With minor alterations, this and the accompanying questionnaire
were sent to both board and teacher association officials.
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A SINGLE, REGION-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS DESIRABLE.
GOOD
—
- BAD
UGLY
- BEAUTIFUL
SWEET
- SOUR
DIRTY
CLEAN
TASTY
DISTASTEFUL
WORTHLESS VALUABLE
PLEASANT UNPLEASANT
BITTER SWEET
HAPPY UNHAPPY
PROFANE SACRED
FRAGRANT FOUL
DISHONEST HONEST
FAIR UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
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2. REGION-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WILL MAKE THE SCHOOL BOARD
MEMBER’S* JOB EASIER.
GOOD
BAD
UGLY
BEAUTIFUL
SWEET
SOUR
DIRTY CLEAN
TASTY
DISTASTEFUL
WORTHLESS VALUABLE
PLEASANT UNPLEASANT
BITTER SWEET
HAPPY UNHAPPY
PROFANE SACRED
FRAGRANT FOUL
DISHONEST HONEST
FAIR UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
*
"Board member's" changed to "association member’s" on question-
naire to association officials.
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3. REGION-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WILL NOT COST THE TOWN MORE MONEY
GOOD
UGLY
SWEET
DIRTY
TASTY
WORTHLESS
PLEASANT
BITTER
HAPPY
PROFANE
FRAGRANT
DISHONEST
FAIR
BAD
BEAUTIFUL
SOUR
CLEAN
DISTASTEFUL
VALUABLE
UNPLEASANT
SWEET
UNHAPPY
SACRED
FOUL
HONEST
UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
REGION WIDE COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
LOCAL CONTROL OF THE SCHOOLS.
GOOD
UGLY
SWEET
DIRTY
TASTY
WORTHLESS
PLEASANT
BITTER
HAPPY
PROFANE
FRAGRANT
DISHONEST
FAIR
BAD
BEAUTIFUL
SOUR
CLEAN
DISTASTEFUL
VALUABLE
UNPLEASANT
SWEET
UNHAPPY
SACRED
FOUL
HONEST
UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
5. REGION-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OFFERS EQUAL ADVANTAGES TO BOTH
THE TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE SCHOOL BOARDS.
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GOOD
UGLY
SWEET
DIRTY
TASTY
WORTHLESS
PLEASANT
BITTER
HAPPY
PROFANE
FRAGRANT
DISHONEST
FAIR
BAD
BEAUTIFUL
SOUR
CLEAN
DISTASTEFUL
VALUABLE
UNPLEASANT
SWEET
UNHAPPY
SACRED
FOUL
HONEST
UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
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6. THE TOWNS IN SCHOOL UNION NO. 64 ARE VERY SIMILAR IN TERMS OF
FINANCIAL ABILITY.
GOOD
UGLY
SWEET
DIRTY
TASTY
WORTHLESS
PLEASANT
BITTER
HAPPY
PROFANE
FRAGRANT
DISHONEST
FAIR
BAD
BEAUTIFUL
SOUR
CLEAN
DISTASTEFUL
VALUABLE
UNPLEASANT
SWEET
UNHAPPY
SACRED
FOUL
HONEST
UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
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THE VOTERS WOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING REGION-WIDE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SCHOOL UNION NO. 64.
GOOD
BAD
UGLY
BEAUTIFUL
SWEET
SOUR
DIRTY
Z"’ T T1 A ATCLEAN
TASTY
DISTASTEFUL
WORTHLESS VALUABLE
PLEASANT UNPLEASANT
BITTER SWEET
UNHAPPY
PROFANE SACRED
FRAGRANT F0UL
DISHONEST HONEST
FAIR UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
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8. REGION-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IS FEASIBLE IN SCHOOL UNION
NO. 64.
GOOD
BAD
UGLY
BEAUTIFUL
SWEET SOUR
DIRTY CLEAN
TASTY DISTASTEFUL
WORTHLESS VALUABLE
PLEASANT UNPLEASANT
BITTER SWEET
HAPPY UNHAPPY
PROFANE SACRED
FRAGRANT FOUL
DISHONEST HONEST
FAIR UNFAIR
AWFUL NICE
APPENDIX B
SAMPLE FOLLOW-UP POSTCARD
SAMPLE*
December 14, 1971
Dear School Board Member:
If you have not already done so, would you please complete the
questionnaire I mailed to you on December 7, 1971. I realize that
this is a busy season and many demands are being made of you; howeve
I would be most appreciative of your early response to this question
naire
.
Thank you, and have a Merry Christmas.
Wayne Emerson
* Similar postcards were mailed to all teacher representatives
who had not responded after one week.
APPENDIX C
SAMPLE FOLLOW-UP LETTER
fiu&eMS
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ATIONS AND RESEARCH CENTER
Draper Hall
Area Code 413
545-2893, 545-2884, or 545-2860
December 29, 1971
Dear Sir:
As part of a research project I am currently involved with, I
recently mailed to you a questionnaire on region—wide collective
bargaining in the public schools. In this questionnaire you
were asked to indicate your reactions to several statements
associated with the feasibility of establishing some form of
region-wide collective bargaining in School Union No. 64. You
were also asked to briefly comment on what you believed to be
the advantages and/or disadvantages of region-wide collective
bargaining.
While the overall response has been very good, the success or
failure of this project depends in great part upon the coopera-
tion of all local officials. Therefore, if you have not already
done so, I would very much appreciate it if you could find time
to fill out the questionnaire and mail it in the stamped, self
addressed envelope.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Best wishes for the new year,
Wayne L. Emerson
WLE: jas
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Agreement
A written contract between an employer and an employee organiza-
tion, usually for a definite term, defining conditions of employment
(wages, hours, and working conditions), and procedures to be followed
in settling disputes or handling issues that arise during the life of
the agreement.
American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organization
(AFL-CIO)
A federation of autonomous national and international unions
created by the merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955. The initials
AFL-CIO indicate that a union is an affiliate of this organization.
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (AFT)
Organized in 1916, the AFT is a trade union-oriented organization
of classroom teachers. With approximately 450 local affiliates, AFT
has approximately 250,000 members, most of whom are concentrated in
large cities. The AFT has been considered to be the most militant of
the two major teacher organizations.
Appropriate Bargaining Unit
See Bargaining Unit.
Arbitration
A method of settling disputes through recourse to an impartial
third party. In the public sector the primary use of arbitration in-
volves the interpretation of the terms of an existing contract. Occa-
sionally, arbitration involves disputes over what the contract terms
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ought to be. The arbitrator's decisions are final and binding on the
parties. (Advisory arbitration is similar to fact finding, and the
arbitrator's finding is only advisory to the parties.)
Bargaining Agent
The employee organization designated by an appropriate government
agency or recognized voluntarily by the employer as the representative
of all employees in the bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Such representation is usually exclusive of any other
employee organization.
Bargaining Unit
Group of employees recognized by the employer or designated by an
authorized agency as appropriate for representation by an organization
for purposes of collective bargaining. "Appropriateness" is usually
determined by a community of interests among the employees sought to
be included.
Certification
Formal designation by a government agency of the organization
selected by the majority of the employees in a supervised election to
act as exclusive representative for all employees in the bargaining
unit.
Collective Bargaining (Collective Negotiations)
A process by which an employee organization negotiates with an
employer in good faith with a view toward reaching agreement on wages,
hours and conditions of employment. The process does not require
either party to agree to any particular proposal nor does it require
the making of a concession.
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Community of Interest
A description of the criteria employed by a government agency to
determine whether a group of employees sought to be represented by an
employee organization constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit.
Criteria may include similarity of skills, common supervision, common
hours, wages and working conditions.
Contract
See Agreement.
Contract Bar
A denial of a request for a representation election by Union B
based on the existence of a written, signed collective bargaining
agreement with Union A, which meets certain technical requirements
as to content.
Decertification
Withdrawal by a government agency of an employee organization’s
official designation as exclusive negotiating representative, usually
as a result of employee dissatisfaction.
Dispute
Any disagreement between an employer and the employee organization
which requires resolution in one way or another. Disputes may arise
during contract negotiation and/or administration.
Election
See Representation Election.
Exclusive Representative
The employee organization designated as the only organization to
bargain collectively for all employees (including non-members) in a
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bargaining unit.
Fact-Finding
Investigation of a labor dispute or bargaining impasse by an indi-
vidual, panel or board. The fact-finder assembles and reports the
facts, and may make recommendations for settlement. ^ Decisions are
nonbinding
.
Grievance
Usually a complaint by an employee or employee organization alleg-
ing an incorrect or improper interpretation or application of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement or a violation of established union-management
practices. Occasionally defined as any dispute over wages, hours, or
working conditions.
Grievance Procedure
Typically a formal plan, specified in collective bargaining agree-
ment, which provides for the adjustment of grievances through discussion
at progressively higher levels of authority in management and the em-
ployee organization, usually culminating in arbitration if not resolved.
Impasse
A situation in collective bargaining which occurs when the employer
and the employee organization, both negotiating in good faith, fail to
reach agreement.
1 Fact-finding has been relied upon almost exclusively as the pro-
cedure for resolving disputes in the public sector. Often it is accom-
panied by an attempt to resolve the impasse through mediation either by
the fact-finder or another third party.
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Inj unction
A court order restraining individuals, groups or employee organ-
izations from committing unlawful acts or acts which, in the court's
opinion, will cause irreparable harm or endanger public health, safety
or welfare.
Jurisdictional Dispute
Conflict between two or more employee organizations over organiz-
ing or representing workers or whether a certain type of work should
be performed by members of one organization or another.
Management Prerogatives
Rights of a public employer which may be expressly reserved in a
collective bargaining agreement or which may be removed from the scope
of public collective bargaining by state law.
Master Agreement
A single labor agreement covering employees in multiple bargaining
units of one employer or covering employees of a group of employers in
one bargaining unit.
Mediation (Conciliation)
An attempt by an impartial third party to help in collective nego-
tiations or in the settlement of an employment dispute through sugges-
tion, advice, persuasion and/or other methods.
^
Multi-Employer Bargaining
Collective bargaining in the private sector between a union or
^ A very popular procedure in the public sector for the resolution
of contract impasses. May be used singly or in combination with other
impasse resolving procedures.
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unions and a group of employers, usually represented by an employer
association, resulting in a master agreement. In public education
this would include several school district employers and one or more
employee organizations meeting and conferring for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining (see Regional Collective Bargaining)
.
Multi-Unit Bargaining
Collective bargaining between a union or unions which represent (s)
many bargaining units and an employer or group of employers.
National Educational Association (NEA)
Founded in 1857 as the National Teachers Association, the NEA
functions as a professional organization. Representing the interests
of instructional and non-instructional personnel, the NEA has a mem-
bership in excess of 1.7 million.
Ratification
Formal approval of a newly negotiated agreement, normally by vote
of the organization members affected.
Recognition
Formal ackowledgement by a public employer that a particular em-
ployee organization has the right to represent employees in an appro-
priate bargaining unit.
Regional Collective Bargaining (Region-Wide Collective Bargaining)
Collective bargaining between one or more employers and employee
organizations for the purpose of establishing wages, hours and working
conditions for certain employees within a geographic area or district.
133
Reopening Clause
Clause in a collective agreement stating the time or the circum-
stances under which negotiations can be requested, prior to the ex-
piration of the contract, on specific subjects such as weekly salary.
Representation Election
Election conducted to determine whether the employees in an
appropriate unit (see Bargaining Unit) desire a labor organization
to act as their exclusive representative.
Ripple Effect
Impact Oi a negotiated salary increase or other economic benefit
on employees of the same employer who are not in the same bargaining
unit
.
Sanction
Action taken by an employee organization against an employer de-
signed to bring pressure to bear upon the employer to reach a "favor-
able" settlement. Action may include (but not be limited to) mass
meetings, boycotts, work-stoppages and organization expulsion of mem-
bers who accept employment with the "sactioned" employer.
Strike
Temporary stoppage of work by a group of employees to express a
grievance, enforce a demand for changes in conditions of employment,
obtain recognition, or resolve a dispute with management. "Wildcat
Strike": a strike not sactioned by union and one which frequently
violates the collective bargaining agreement. "Quickie Strike": a
spontaneous or unannounced strike of short duration. "Slowdown": a
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deliberate reduction of output without an actual strike in order to
obtain concessions from the employer. "Sympathy Strike": strike of
employees not directly involved in a dispute, but who wish to demon-
strate employee solidarity or bring additional pressure on the em-
ployer involved. "Sitdown Strike": strike during which employees
remain in the workplace, but refuse to work or allow others to do so.
Walkout": same as a strike.
Strike Vote
Vote conducted among members of an employee organization to de-
termine whether or not a strike should be authorized.
Unfair Labor Practice
Action by either an employer or employee organization which vio-
lates certain provisions of national, state, or local labor relations
acts
.
Union Security
Protection of a union s status by a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement establishing a union shop, agency shop or main-
tenance-of-membership agreement.
Union Shop : The employer may hire anyone, but all employees must
join the union within a specified time period, and must remain members
as a condition of employment. A Modified Union Shop may exempt those
already employed at the time the contract provision was negotiated.
Agency Shop : Requires all employees who do not join the union to
pay a fixed amount, usually the equivalent of union dues, to the union
as a condition of employment. The purpose of the money is to pay for
the agency services rendered by the union. This clause is sometimes
referred to as an Agency Service Fee.
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M_aintenance-of-Membership
: This contract provision requires that
employees who are union members at the time the provision is negotia-
ted, or who join the union during the life of the agreement, must main-
tain their union membership as a condition of employment.
Union Steward
An elected or appointed worker who carries out union duties, e.g.
,
processes grievances, collects dues, recruits new members. While there
are exceptions, the steward usually continues to work at his regular
job.
Whipsawing
The tactic of negotiating with one employer at a time, using each
negotiated gain as a bargaining lever against the next employer.
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